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And We have made you into 
a community of justice, that you 
may be a testament unto humanity.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite its currently conservative character, the modern practice of 
Islamic finance lies on a bedrock of social, cultural, and economic revo-
lution.2 Examination of these revolutionary origins and their attendant 
jurisprudential implications reveals much about the schizophrenia 
plaguing Islamic finance today, of a largely formalist practice repeating 
the functional aims of the early revolutionaries and falsely understood 
by substantial portions of the wider Muslim community to be achieving 
such aims. Though the revolution has not come to pass, some of the 
comparatively radical functional approaches conceived in the context of 
the anticipated upheaval, in particular those of the Iraqi Shi’i jurist Mu-
hammad Baqir al-Sadr, deserve reconsideration and refinement as a 
means through which to reformulate the entire practice of Islamic fi-
nance in a manner that realizes more completely the aspirations of the 
broader Muslim community in its call for uniquely Islamic forms of 
human association in Muslim societies. 
                                                          
1. QUR’AN 2:143. 
2. The revolutionaries at issue also embraced goals that were distinctly political, and most 
commentary concerning them is devoted to their political activity and its resonance among con-
temporary militant Islamic movements. See, e.g., JOHN L. ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN 
THE NAME OF ISLAM (2002). However, in keeping with the focus of this Article on Islamic fi-
nance and economics, I address primarily the social, cultural, and economic aspects of the revolu-
tion and deemphasize its political component. 
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The objective of the aforementioned revolution was the radical trans-
formation of Islamic societies based on Islamic Revelation and the es-
tablishment of forms of human association grounded in Islamic concep-
tions of fairness and social justice. This transformation would, it was 
hoped, result in the creation of a social order that was distinct from the 
then competing models of the United States, on the one hand, and the 
Soviet Union and its satellite states, on the other.3 There is a deep and 
venerable tradition within Islamic societies of the study of the body of 
Islamic rules, norms, and laws developed by jurists, known as the 
shari’a, as compared with any sort of “Islamic” social science such as 
economics or history.4 As a result, the proponents of the anticipated 
revolution almost universally approached the subject in distinctly legal 
terms.5 To achieve such radical aims using the law, these advocates re-
quired a level of functionality in Islamic jurisprudence that was lacking 
at the time. The revolution therefore encompassed not only the forms of 
human association, but, implicitly, the legal means by which they might 
be achieved; it was, in other words, as much a jurisprudential and legal 
revolution as it was a social, cultural, and economic one. Among the 
most prominent of the revolutionaries, both in influence, and, more im-
portantly, in the level of development of his ideas, was Sadr.6 
                                                          
3. The prominent economist Mahmoud El-Gamal refers to Sadr and two other revolutionary 
figures, the Pakistani Islamist Syed Abul Al’a Mawdudi and the Egyptian radical Sayyid Qutb, as 
being responsible for the establishment of Islamic economics. See Mahmoud El-Gamal, “Inter-
est” and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 108, 
115 n.18 (2003). Each of these individuals manifested their revolutionary ideals in different ways. 
Sadr was an influential force in the development of Iran’s post-revolutionary legal and economic 
system. See Section II.B.3, infra. Qutb has been an inspiration for a number of militant Sunni Is-
lamic movements. See ESPOSITO, supra note 2, at 8 (describing Qutb as the “father of militant 
jihad, a major influence on the worldview of radical movements across the Muslim world, and 
venerated as a martyr of contemporary Islamic revivalism”). Mawdudi called for the overthrow of 
the secular state and its replacement with a democracy tightly controlled by scholars of Islamic 
law. NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY 
121–22 (2d ed. 2004). 
4. See JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1964) (describing Islamic 
law as the “epitome of Islamic thought” and “the core and kernel of Islam itself”). 
5. CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW 1–2 (1993). 
6. In terms of the development of a specific methodology to achieve their revolutionary eco-
nomic objectives, Sadr’s most prominent contemporaries, Qutb and Mawdudi, are less than com-
prehensive in their approach to formalism. They make repeated calls for social and economic jus-
tice in their work and suggest that such justice can only be realized with the radical 
transformation of society along Islamic lines, but as to the mechanics of the transformation, much 
is left vague and imprecise. See Section IV.B, infra. See generally SYED ABUL ALA MAWDUDI, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND ISLAM (Sharif Ahmad Khan trans., Islamic Book Publishers 1977); 
SAYYID QUTB, AL-’ADALA AL-IJTIMA’IYYAH FIL ISLAM (1st ed. 15th prtg. 2002).  
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The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it will expose Sadr’s 
revolutionary jurisprudential approach in developing the notions of 
commercial order revealed in his seminal work Iqtisaduna, or, Our Eco-
nomics.7 Second, it will demonstrate means by which some of Sadr’s 
radical notions, developed in the context of the theology of Usuli 
Shi’ism, can be used to make the shari’a a more salutary force in the 
economic and social order of Muslim states. 
The revolutionary, and inherently Islamic, nature of Sadr’s notions of 
economics and commercial order are immediate and obvious. He rejects 
outright both the authoritarian state control of Soviet-style Marxism and 
the comparatively unconstrained commercial sphere that is created in 
capitalist societies in favor of what he describes as an Islamic alterna-
tive.8 He is passionately committed to social justice as a norm central to 
the creation of this Islamic social and economic order.9 He takes very 
seriously the idea that central to Muslim social harmony is the creation 
of commercial enterprises wherein parties thereto share in the profits 
and losses thereof equitably, and he is hostile to forms of association 
wherein one party could conceivably earn a profit while his business 
partner and fellow believer might, in the context of the same undertak-
ing, suffer a significant loss.10 To the modern Muslim mind, this is the 
source of the concern over the taking of interest and the engaging in 
speculative commercial activity; namely, that they create the potential 
for disproportionate losses and gains, and that such disproportionality 
has the potential to sow enmity and hatred within the community.11 
Given the near unanimity of Islamic theologians on this matter, it would 
be fair to say that the entire intellectual movement of Islamic finance 
rests on such ideas. 
Yet Sadr, unlike his contemporaries, developed a theory of jurispru-
dence that was intended precisely to achieve the articulated goals.12 It is 
                                                          
7. See generally MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-SADR, IQTISADUNA (1977) [hereinafter 
IQTISADUNA]. 
8. See Section III.A.1, infra. 
9. Id. 
10. See Section III.D, infra. 
11. See Timur Kuran, On the Notion of Economic Justice in Contemporary Islamic Thought, 
21 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 171, 171–76 (1989) (describing the importance of the mutuality 
principle among Islamic economists); see also Haider Ala Hamoudi, Muhammad’s Social Justice 
or Muslim Cant?: Langdellianism and the Failures of Islamic Finance, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 89 
(2006) (discussing a number of modern, influential Islamic theologians who justify the practices 
of Islamic finance on the basis of the mutuality principle). 
12. Jurisprudential radicalism is only one characteristic of Iqtisaduna. In addition, its ideas on 
Islamic economics are considerably more comprehensive than any contemporary work on the 
subject in the same period. As a result, it proved deeply influential to subsequent Islamic econo-
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this kind of methodology, whereby rules are purposefully derived to 
achieve particular ends that relate to preferred modalities and institu-
tions of human association, that I refer to herein as “functionalism.”  In 
employing his functional approach, Sadr called for a “deviationist doc-
trine” that rejected the then dominant presupposition that the two cur-
rent objectivist models of capitalism and Marxism embody the sole 
forms of human association possible in the modern era.13 He used the 
law to delineate the purportedly Islamic alternative. He developed that 
law in a manner that he admitted was necessarily deeply influenced by 
his own subjective political and ideological presuppositions towards so-
cial justice and mutuality. In so doing, Sadr resembled Roberto Unger’s 
description of the Critical Legal Theorist railing against nineteenth cen-
tury notions of Langdellian legal science as the perfect expression of a 
democratic republic and the free market.14 
Of course, the analogy to Critical Legal Theory is imperfect and in-
complete, though some might argue otherwise.15 The prominent Islamic 
studies professor Sherman Jackson raised the possibility that Islamic ju-
rists operate in the overtly political and subjective fashion suggested by 
Unger despite claiming adherence to the rules of the traditional interpre-
tive system. As I shall explain in further detail below, Professor Jack-
son’s well-articulated work on the inherent manipulability of Islamic 
doctrine and his comparative efforts with respect to Critical Legal The-
ory as expounded by Unger deserve immense praise for providing a new 
means of appraising the development of the shari’a. However, the scope 
of Jackson’s claim, while thoughtful and intriguing, is not terribly con-
structive for those interested in a more prescriptive approach to Islamic 
jurisprudence.  To repeat the criticisms of Michael Dorf and Samuel Is-
sacharoff concerning what they describe as “radical offshoots of legal 
realism” in another context, such descriptions may serve to delegitimize 
the entire notion of Islamic legal or religious doctrine, but, given the 
implications, they are not helpful in reforming the doctrine to serve the 
modern community more effectively.16 
                                                                                                                                      
mists, who were willing to adopt some of Sadr’s economic ideas without, regrettably, the neces-
sary functional jurisprudential tools that would equip them with the flexibility necessary to ad-
dress continuing economic challenges. See MALLAT, supra note 5, at 142–43. 
13. See generally Roberto Manabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 561, 567–68 (1983) (noting the false choice between “market and command economies”). 
14. See id. at 576–83. 
15. See generally Sherman A. Jackson, Fiction and Formalism: Toward a Functional Analy-
sis of Usul al-Fiqh, in STUDIES IN ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORY 177 (Bernard G. Weis ed., 2002). 
16. Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 923, 948 (2001) (describing how the “radical realist tradition,” by arguing that all 
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As a result, despite the radicalism with which he approached shari’a 
and his explicit suggestion that its derivation is often an enterprise of 
political and ideological choice, Sadr himself is deeply concerned with 
what he calls subjectivity and does not believe that he is engaged in an 
unbridled exercise of it.17 What then to make of him? How to reconcile 
his easy dismissal of the Langdellian formalism that plagues Islamic 
doctrine, his willingness to employ radically unorthodox means to 
achieve new meanings, and yet his abiding concern with excessive sub-
jectivity? Is there a means, in other words, by which Sadr envisions that 
Islamic legal doctrine might sensibly reform in a manner that permits it 
to steer safely clear of the Scylla and Charbydis of Langdellian formal-
ism and unbounded subjectivity, where all law descends into politics? 
Sadr’s particular and uniquely Islamic solution arose within the insti-
tutional framework within which he operated. Sadr was an Iraqi Shi’i 
jurist, born in 1935 to a historic and celebrated clerical family and ac-
tive from about 1963 until his execution by the regime of Saddam Hus-
sein in April of 1980.18  Given his background and training, Sadr was 
groomed almost from birth to become a member of the loose network of 
Shi’i jurists, largely based in Najaf, Iraq, known as the marja’iyya. Pur-
suant to the doctrine of Usuli Shi’ism, which is the dominant form of 
Twelver Shi’ism with which this Article is concerned, the marja’iyya is 
the sole institution with the authority to determine the content of the 
shari’a.19 This authority has been delegated, in a sense, from a lineal 
descendant of Muhammad known as the Mahdi,20 who remains in hid-
                                                                                                                                      
law is politics, may serve to delegitimize entirely the Supreme Court as an institution, but could 
hardly influence the Court’s decisions). 
17. IQTISADUNA, supra note 7, at 360 (“[A]nd to take the danger of subjectivity seri-
ously…we must look into this matter clearly, and delineate the source of the danger.”). 
18. Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, Introduction to MUHAMMAD BAQIR AS-SADR, LESSONS IN 
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 28, 31 (Mottahedeh trans., 2d ed. Oneworld Publ’ns 2003) (1978) 
[hereinafter LESSONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE]. For more information about Sadr’s life and 
work, see also Section II.B.3, infra. 
19. MALLAT, supra note 5, at 75–83 (describing role of marja’iyya in Usuli Shi’ism). 
Twelver Shi’ism is the dominant, but not the exclusive form of Shi’ism that exists in the world 
today. JUAN COLE, SACRED SPACE AND HOLY WAR 5 (2005) (noting rise and ultimate dominance 
of Twelver Usuli Shi’ism in the nineteenth century). For purposes of this Article, which deals 
only with Twelver Shi’i doctrine, I use the term Shi’ism to refer exclusively to Twelver Shi’ism 
and in particular the Usuli version thereof. See generally infra note 74 (noting the origin of the 
term “Twelver Shi’ism”). For more information concerning Usuli Shi’ism, see Section II.A, infra. 
20. There are Sunni references and Sunni movements that have arisen from time to time sur-
rounding the arrival of a descendant of Muhammad known as the Mahdi who has been sent by 
God to redeem the world. See generally P. M. HOLT, THE MAHDIST STATE IN THE SUDAN 1881-
1898: A STUDY OF ITS ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND OVERTHROW (2d ed. 1970); FERGUS 
NICOLL, THE SWORD OF THE PROPHET, THE MAHDI OF SUDAN AND THE DEATH OF GENERAL 
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ing today and who has a unique link to the Divine that enables him to 
know God’s will with respect to all matters.21 The Mahdi’s delegation 
of authority therefore provides to Shi’i jurists operating within the 
marja’iyya an ability to develop more creative interpretations of founda-
tional text than their Sunni counterparts, who have no comparable theo-
logical justification. Sunni jurists are expected to be interpreting text ob-
jectively, and any assault on their neutrality in doing so is perceived to 
be inherently destabilizing in the absence of an authoritative institution. 
As Professor Jackson has noted, it is precisely this quest for an objective 
authority in order to defuse debate that has led Sunni jurists to abandon 
the effort to develop their own interpretations of foundational text at the 
end of the first millennium, relying instead on the interpretive efforts of 
their forebears as divided into established schools of thought (madha-
hib).22 With the dissolution of the schools, however, Sunni jurispru-
dence in the modern era has fallen into a fair level of confusion and un-
certainty.23 This explains much of the preoccupation in the Sunni 
Islamic world with codification of supposedly classical rules as a means 
to assert authority, so that authority is not obtained through institutions 
or individuals, but rather through the introduction of what are identified, 
correctly or not, as acceptable classical rules in the framework of the 
modern nation state.24 
By contrast, the authority of the marja’iyya to speak for the Mahdi 
during his hiding remains largely intact and thus when the marja’iyya 
speaks, it necessarily speaks with authority. It is important to note that 
the marja’iyya never takes an explicit, uniform position as an institu-
tion. Rather, its organizational structure is characterized by a series of 
informal hierarchies operating in parallel to one another.25 Each jurist of 
sufficient standing runs effectively his own seminary and derives his 
own shari’a rules largely independently of other jurists. Moreover, the 
marja’iyya holds no formal meetings nor does it confer any formal sort 
of membership. However, the immense cultural importance of the insti-
tution and the concomitant desire of jurists to remain legitimate to their 
                                                                                                                                      
GORDON (2004). However, the notion of a living Mahdi currently in hiding who has an intimate 
connection to God is unique to the Shi’a. See note 21 and accompanying text, infra. 
21. ALLAMAH SAYYID MUHAMMAD HUSAYN TABATABA’I, SHI’ITE ISLAM 41, 209–14 (Sey-
yed Hossein Nasr trans., George Allen & Unwin 1975). 
22. SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARAFI 69–79 (1996).  
23. Id. at xvi–xviii. 
24. Id. 
25. See Section II.B, infra. 
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fellow jurists and the broader Shi’i community by not diverging wildly 
from the competing interpretations of others effectively forces coher-
ence onto the interpretive process.26 
To Sadr, therefore, the marja’iyya, as an institution, may establish le-
gitimate, neutral and definable bounds to interpretation that distinguish 
it from purely individualized, subjective political argument. These pa-
rameters will undoubtedly reflect ideological and ethical understandings 
of the foundational texts of Revelation, but within that framework, ob-
jective, disciplining rules will emerge to constrain individualized sub-
jectivity on the part of any single jurist engaged in the process of inter-
pretation. Subjectivity and ideological choice in the interpretive process 
remain possible, but to be credible such choice would necessarily need 
to lie within the framework established by the marja’iyya at any given 
time.27 
Sadr sought to use this theological position to force a change in un-
derstanding concerning Islamic jurisprudence among the members of 
the marja’iyya. Sadr considered the rise of communism among the Iraqi 
Shi’i community of his time to be a dangerous threat to the social order, 
and he felt that the formalist obsessions of the marja’iyya, directed pri-
marily at minutiae surrounding rituals of worship, would be insufficient 
to address that threat.28 Sadr therefore sought a particularly and 
uniquely Islamic alternative to the rising influence of Marxism, in par-
ticular, that he hoped would reshape the social, political, and economic 
order of Muslim societies in a manner that he identified as Islamic and 
that he traced back to ideals set forth in Islam’s foundational text. In or-
der to project his aims beyond the confines of his own subjective analy-
ses and establish the understandings he put forward as being mandated 
by shari’a, Sadr needed to induce the generally conservative marja’iyya 
to reassess fundamentally the content of the shari’a and develop a new 
understanding of foundational text. 
Sadr understood and acknowledged this to be a largely political and 
ideological exercise that necessarily is subjective in its nature. However, 
                                                          
26. Id. 
27. An analogy may well exist to American jurisprudence. Owen Fiss, for example, has ar-
gued that the judiciary serves a similar role in the American context, effectively bounding in 
some objective fashion the subjective interpretive process employed by any individual judge. 
Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744–45 (1982). The idea 
that the interpretive community creates objective rules is not shared by contextualists such as 
Stanley Fish, who would argue that the interpretive community merely inculcates its members 
with particular assumptions, understandings, and biases, rather than providing them neutral 
bounds within which to operate. Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984). 
28. See Section II.B.3, infra. 
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this did not concern Sadr. He believed that objective, neutral, and le-
gitimate limitations would ultimately be placed on the interpretive en-
terprise to constrain the individual interpretations of the jurists if the 
marja’iyya as an institution were to adopt his approach in evaluating Is-
lamic jurisprudence and, as the sole authority responsible for deriving 
the shari’a, redefine it along the lines he articulated. Therefore, much as 
Professor Fletcher argues that Lincoln effectively introduced a new 
Constitution in the United States at the close of the Civil War that em-
phasized equality over liberty by invoking values set forth in the Decla-
ration of Independence, Sadr sought effectively to revisit large portions 
of the shari’a and recreate it, or rather have the marja’iyya redefine it, 
as a functional instrument with fairness, egalitarianism, and social jus-
tice being among the paramount objectives to be achieved.29  Unfortu-
nately, however, much as Lincoln’s ideals of formal legal equality lay 
dormant in the United States immediately after his death due to resis-
tance from the relevant interpretive community, the judiciary,30 so has 
Shi’ism largely ignored Sadr’s calls for a reformed jurisprudence de-
spite professed expressions of admiration of him among the Shi’a, as 
well as from broader sectors of the Muslim world.31 
Some of the particularities of Sadr’s economic and jurisprudential 
philosophy are grounded in his Shi’i context, but the broader lesson to 
be learned continues to resonate. Understanding Sadr’s revolutionary 
approach to Islamic economics reveals more starkly the existential prob-
lem plaguing the one facet of Islamic economics that continues to sur-
vive, Islamic finance.32 As noted above, proponents of Islamic finance 
and Islamic banking repeat Sadr’s aims in describing their practice. 
Sadly, however, they hardly adopt any functional approaches necessary 
to achieve them. 
                                                          
29. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: HOW LINCOLN REDEFINED 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 24–25 (2001). 
30. See id. at 115 (“Had the United States been able to begin anew, with judges educated in 
the values and vision of Gettysburg,…Lincoln’s prophecy…might have prevailed. […] Yet, this 
was not to be the fate of postbellum America.”). 
31. See, e.g., MALLAT, supra note 5, at 142–43 (discussing the widespread use of and respect 
for Iqtisaduna in Muslim circles); T. M. Aziz, The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Shi’i Po-
litical Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980, 25 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 207, 218 (1993); Motta-
hedeh, Introduction to LESSONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 33 (describing 
Sadr’s popularity and influence in Iraq).  
32. OLIVIER ROY, THE FAILURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM 140–41 (Carol Volk trans., Harvard 
Univ. Press 1994) (1992) (describing the collapse of Islamic economics outside of the finance 
paradigm). 
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With the eventual disappearance of the functionally distinct jurispru-
dential system that Sadr advocated, Islamic finance has been plagued by 
formalism, which I define for purposes of this Article in a very limited 
fashion as the type of logic driven formalism embraced by nineteenth-
century American legal theorists, particularly Christopher Columbus 
Langdell.33 As a result, rather than attempt to develop the distinct means 
of finance as articulated by the scholarly Muslim community, Islamic 
financial institutions devote themselves to the creation of elaborate 
forms of potentially deceptive artifices in order to circumvent prohibi-
tions derived under otherwise unworkable Islamic rules, most impor-
tantly those concerning interest on debt and forms of speculative risk.34 
Islamic finance is thus at present little more than “an almost random 
patchwork of rules that are neither cohesive nor coherent.”35 Religious 
doctrine serves largely “to obfuscate and complicate at some expense, 
while simultaneously and disingenuously asserting highly exaggerated 
claims of equity and social justice.”36 
Thus, while the dreams of economic revolution may have long faded, 
the absolute necessity of a jurisprudential revolution has not. As Abdul-
lahi An-Na’im has indicated, unless Muslims are prepared to reevaluate 
critically their historical understandings of the shari’a, Islam cannot act 
as a positive force in the lives of Muslims.37 In fact, a fairly compelling 
argument can be made that the shari’a, in the context of finance, acts as 
a hindrance to the pious by imposing on them senseless transaction 
costs for no apparent purpose.38 Sadr’s idea of a transformed and trans-
forming jurisprudence, bounded by objective and neutral rules on inter-
pretive process imposed through the consensus of an authoritative inter-
                                                          
33. See Section I.A, infra. Obviously, many other conceptions of formalism exist, see, e.g., 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23–25 
(1997); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
583 (1993), but none are relevant for purposes of this Article.  
34. Hamoudi, supra note 11, at 91, 94–95. 
35. Id. at 95. 
36. Id. 
37. Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate, 94 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 95, 97–99 (2000). 
38. In other contemporary contexts, this same argument that the shari’a acts deleteriously in 
the lives of at least some Muslims can be made with even more dramatic force. The most notable 
case concerns the rights of women, where the shari’a as currently developed and applied to vary-
ing extents in many Islamic nations imposes and legitimizes a standard of discrimination almost 
unknown elsewhere in the modern era, with provisions including forced marriage of minors, un-
equal rights to inheritance, limited opportunities for divorce and heavily discounted values of 
court testimony. See N.J. COULSON, SUCCESSION IN THE MUSLIM FAMILY (1971); JOHN L. 
ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW (1982); Donna E. Arzt, Human Rights Law in Is-
lamic States, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 202 (1990). 
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pretive community responsible for redefining foundational text from 
time to time, is instrumental to the development of a sensible and func-
tional Islamic system based entirely in Islamic doctrine and responsive 
to the needs of the community. 
Part I of this Article will summarize the traditional, formalist Islamic 
interpretive system employed in Islamic finance today, reveal its simi-
larity to Langdellian legal theory, and further explain how these inter-
pretive principles developed rules governing the modern practice of Is-
lamic finance that strip it of its ability to meet its articulated aims. Part 
II will then provide context for Sadr’s ideas by describing the social, re-
ligious, and political context in which he developed them. Part II will 
also describe Sadr’s own background and the nature of his other work 
both within and outside of the marja’iyya. Part III will set forth in broad 
outline the revolutionary aims of the economic system described by 
Sadr and the manner in which functionalism pervades his entire analy-
sis. Part IV will then provide a more complete description of Sadr’s 
jurisprudential notions and their reliance on the robust role of the 
marja’iyya to redefine the shari’a on the basis of the foundational texts. 
Part V will describe contemporary Islamic finance and expose the prac-
tice as hopelessly formalist. Finally, Part VI will explain how some of 
Sadr’s ideas can be usefully employed in a considerably more conserva-
tive capacity to reform Islamic finance along more sensible, functional 
lines through specific reference to a commercial issue that has been of 
international interest in the past two decades, namely, the extent to 
which commercial banks should expand into other financial services ac-
tivities, most prominently the purchase and sale of securities. 
I. LANGDELLIAN FORMALISM IN THE ISLAMIC EXPERIENCE39 
A. Islamic Langdellianism Defined 
The contemporary interpretive trend in the Islamic world is highly 
formalistic and similar in numerous ways to the jurisprudential theories 
of Christopher Columbus Langdell in the American context. Where 
                                                          
39. Much of what is written here is a summary of another article devoted to the subject of Is-
lamic formalism in the context of contemporary Islamic finance. See Hamoudi, supra note 11. I 
wish to emphasize, as I did in the above mentioned article, that my criticisms are directed exclu-
sively to a contemporary manifestation of an interpretive system that claims its origins in Islamic 
history and not to the rich and varied Muslim jurisprudence of the classical era. Id. at 102–03; see 
also Haider Ala Hamoudi, Jurisprudential Schizophrenia: On Form and Function in Islamic Fi-
nance, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 605 (2007). 
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Langdell used cases as the most basic units of his jurisprudential the-
ory,40 Islamic Langdellianism supplements the few, undefined, and 
largely incomplete legal edicts of the Qur’an with “cases” of its own; 
namely, the hadith, which are statements, actions, or utterances of the 
Prophet Muhammad in particular contexts, such as Muhammad inform-
ing the believers not to sell uncaught fish or the sperm of a stallion.41 
The hadith and the Qur’an are the two primary sources of law,42 and, 
because the interpretive system does not admit of the possibility of Mu-
hammad’s hadith violating the Qur’an, the more numerous and specific 
hadith act in effect as a superior source of law.43 
The superiority of the hadith to the Qur’an is further demonstrated by 
the method by which they are to be verified for authenticity. Langdell 
asserted that the proper cases needed to be selected in order to develop 
the theory, but never specified the methodology to employ in the selec-
tion process.44 However, Islamic Langdellianism is much more careful 
in determining whether a given statement or action actually originated 
with Muhammad himself. The methodology does not involve considera-
tions of equity, public interest, or even harmony with the Qur’an. 
Rather, authenticity is determined in the first instance on the basis of a 
chain of supposedly reliable narrators known as an isnad, often going 
back nearly two centuries, reporting a statement of Muhammad.45 For 
example, “And Malik, [who has heard] from Zaid son of Aslam [who 
has heard] from Atta son of Yasar, [who has heard] from Bassir son of 
                                                          
40. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977). 
41. See note 62 and accompanying text, infra. 
42. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources, Interpretation, and Rule-
Making, 1 U.C.L.A. J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 139–40 (2002). The Shi’a expand the hadith to 
include the statements and utterances of particular descendants of Muhammad known as the 
Imams. LESSONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 192. The role of the Imams in 
Shi’a jurisprudence and theology is described in more detail in Section II.A, infra. 
43. An excellent example of this lies in the Prophetic hadith prescribing death by stoning to 
be the punishment for non-marital relations (zina) for non-virgin women, a punishment that re-
mains law in some Islamic countries to this day. See, e.g., Vanessa Von Struensee, Stoning, 
Shari’a, and Human Rights Law in Nigeria, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 405 (2005). This 
punishment, however, lies in flat contradiction to the Qur’an, which prescribes one hundred 
lashes for any man or woman engaged in sexual relations outside of marriage. QUR’AN 24:2. Is-
lamic Langdellianism explains away this contradiction by suggesting that the hadith do not so 
much contradict the Qur’an’s rule as provide a limited exception to it in the case of non-virgins. 
MUHAMMAD IBN IDRIS AL-SHAFI’I, AL-RISALA, ¶ 227 (1st ed. 1940). 
44. See GILMORE, supra note 40, at 47 (indicating that according to Langdellian theory “the 
function of the legal scholar…is to winnow out from the chaff those very few cases which have 
ever been correctly decided and which, if we follow them, will lead us to the truth”). 
45. BADRAN ABU AL-AYNAYN BADRAN, USUL AL-FIQH 74–75 (1965); see also Muhammad 
Ibn Idris al-Shafi’i, Kitab Ikhtilaf Malik wa Shafi’i, in 8 AL-UMM 513 (Abdul Muttalib ed., 2001). 
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Sa’id, [who has heard] from al-A’raj, who reports that Abu Huraira 
heard [Muhammad] state….” 46 
Langdell derived from his cases fundamental principles from which, 
through deductive logic, he derived clear, specific, and formal rules 
whose application was uncontroversial when applied to stipulated facts. 
Islamic Langdellianism, by contrast, uses a variety of quasi-logical 
techniques under the rubric of qiyas to expand the scope of its cases, the 
hadith, well beyond their original terms.47 Often, qiyas acts as a type of 
pure analogical reasoning, banning, for example, the consumption of all 
intoxicants on the basis of a Qur’anic date wine prohibition.48 At other 
times, however, qiyas employs a type of a fortiori reasoning more de-
ductive in nature, forbidding, for example, the consumption of a large 
portion of an item if the consumption of a smaller portion was forbid-
den.49 Thus, Islamic Langdellianism is not a two step process, whereby 
a case or series of cases is transformed into a fundamental principle 
from which rules are then derived, but rather a one step process, 
whereby “cases” are expanded into broader “fundamental rules” using 
logic-driven principles and processes. 
Moreover, whereas Langdell through the application of rigorous de-
ductive logic could develop formal rules relatively noncontroversially, 
Islamic jurists employing a doctrine such as qiyas could differ on the 
proper application in order to reach a particular result. In such a case, 
there could be no single “legitimate” rule.50 Certainly much of Islamic 
jurisprudence in the classical era obsesses over the casuistic differences 
of interpretations between jurists over applications of qiyas, and jurists 
are careful not to dismiss competing applications as per se illegiti-
mate.51 Nevertheless, to minimize the possibility of such divergence to 
the extent possible, Islamic Langdellianism employs another important 
tool known as ijma, or consensus. Under ijma, as employed by the Is-
                                                          
46. Shafi’i, supra note 45, at 515. 
47. Wael B. Hallaq, Legal Reasoning in Islamic Law and the Common Law: Logic and 
Method, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 79, 82–95 (1985–1986). 
48. Id. at 88–89 (citing this popular example). 
49. See SHAFI’I, supra note 43, ¶ 1483. 
50. Even the rule over precisely which intoxicants were prohibited through qiyas on the basis 
of the date wine prohibition led to considerable debate within the juristic community in the classi-
cal period. MATHEW LIPPMAN ET AL., ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 47–48 (1988). 
51. For an excellent example of a casuistic dispute respecting the scope of a ban on certain 
forms of commercial uncertainty in the classical era and the manner in which a premier medieval 
jurist carefully describes the various positions of competing jurists without delegitimizing any of 
them, see 2 MUHAMMAD IBN AHMAD IBN RUSHD, BIDAYAT AL-MUJTAHID [THE DISTINGUISHED 
JURIST’S PRIMER] 177–81 (1970). 
262 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 48:2 
 
 
lamic Langdellians in the context of Islamic finance, if a juristic consen-
sus develops with respect to a particular application of qiyas, then that 
application is canonized as correct, and any subsequent competing in-
terpretation on the part of any jurist anywhere at any time is per se ille-
gitimate.52 
These four sources, the Qur’an, the hadith, ijma, and qiyas, are the 
four principal bases of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and lead to a highly 
formalist system in the Langdellian sense given the relative absence of 
anti-formalist tools through which rules might be developed.53 As a re-
sult, it is clear that in the derivation of rules, as a methodological matter, 
the functionalism that is necessary to achieve such broader societal aims 
as public interest or social justice is largely absent. 
B. Islamic Langdellianism in Application—Riba and Gharar 
To understand the extent to which Islamic law in its current manifes-
tation in the world of Islamic finance is supremely unconcerned with 
functionalism, one need look no further than the two central prohibi-
tions within Islamic finance today, the first concerning interest on loans 
and the second concerning certain forms of commercial uncertainty. 
As concerns the taking of interest, the ban developed from the 
Qur’anic prohibition of riba. As with much of the Qur’an, however, the 
verses concerning riba are largely undeveloped. The verses condemn 
riba in strident terms,54 indicate it is entirely different from ordinary 
sale (bai’),55 suggest it involves illicit and enormous profit,56 juxtapose 
it unfavorably as against acts of charity,57 and compare it in principle to 
                                                          
52. BADRAN, supra note 45, at 216 (“[W]hen an ijma is built on [an application of] qiyas, it 
renders that [application] something over which none may differ.”). Certainly this understanding 
of ijma has led proponents of Islamic finance to dismiss alternative interpretations of Islamic doc-
trine concerning the application of interest to be fundamentally illegitimate. 
53. Other anti-formalist doctrines, of far lesser significance and far greater controversy, are 
available in the Sunni tradition. Most importantly, there are the twin doctrines of istihsan and 
istislah, which might be loosely rendered into English as equitable consideration and public inter-
est, respectively. Not all jurists accept the legitimacy of these doctrines, however, and in any 
event in their modern manifestations both have withered substantially and are of only marginal 
value in the broader context of the Islamic Langdellian system. See MUHAMMAD ABU ZAHRA, 
USUL AL-FIQH [PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE] 251–254 (1969). 
54. QUR’AN 4:161 (promising a “painful punishment” for those who “devour” riba and those 
who “devour” the property of others falsely). 
55. QUR’AN 2:275. 
56. QUR’AN 3:130 (“Oh ye who believe, do not devour riba, making it double and redou-
ble….”). 
57. See QUR’AN 30:39 (“And whatever you lay out as riba, so that it may increase in the 
property of men, it shall not increase with Allah; and whatever you give in charity, desiring Al-
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a form of theft.58 However, nowhere are the parameters of the activities 
that constitute riba defined. 
The central hadith upon which Islamic finance relies to justify the in-
terest prohibition characterizes as riba certain trades in gold, silver, 
grain, salt, barley, and dates unless hand to hand and without delay.59 
Islamic finance experts claim that these trade prohibitions encompass 
money through qiyas and that this application of qiyas has been canon-
ized through ijma.60 They dismiss competing interpretations as “defeat-
ist” or “apologetic.”61 
The ban on particular forms of commercial uncertainty, known as 
gharar, is based largely on hadith that ban, for example, the sale of fish 
in the sea or the sperm of a stallion.62 Many of these hadith have like-
                                                                                                                                      
lah's pleasure, you shall get manifold.”).    
58. QUR’AN 4:161. 
59. 3 ABDUL-RAZZAQ AL-SANHURI, MASADIR AL-HAQQ FI AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI, DIRASA 
MUQARINA MA’ AL-FIQH AL-GHARBI [THE SOURCES OF RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH WESTERN JURISPRUDENCE] 177 (1967). A similar version appears in 
the Risala as well. SHAFI’I, supra note 43, ¶ 1518. 
60. Jurists in the classical era were quite clearly not focused on loans given this hadith, but 
rather on trades of particular items for others. See, e.g., 3 SANHURI, supra note 59, at 178–94. The 
heightened emphasis on a loan ban derived from the trade prohibition is entirely modern, which is 
all the more puzzling given that contemporary currency is not based on the value of any precious 
metal or other item listed in the hadith. Moreover, the types of functional demands discussed in 
this Article that modern Muslims tend to make concerning Islamic finance and economics are 
largely absent from the contemplations of the classicists, allowing many classical jurists to em-
brace openly the most transparent of artifices to circumvent the interest prohibition. The Hanafis 
and Shafi’i schools, for example, permit the sale of a particular item and its immediate buyback 
by the seller for a higher amount as way to mimic an interest based transaction. See, e.g., 
NICHOLAS DYLAN RAY, ARAB ISLAMIC BANKING AND THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW 56–57 
(1995); ABDULLAH SAEED, ISLAMIC BANKING AND INTEREST 38–39 (2d ed. 1999). However, to 
expound at length on precisely the manner in which the jurists of the classical era approached 
shari’a so as to countenance such artifices would be beyond the scope of this Article. It suffices 
to say that the absolute refusal of Islamic finance to adopt the simplest artifices of the classical 
era, including the sale and immediate buyback, notwithstanding their clear classical pedigree, and 
opt instead for more obfuscatory and potentially deceptive forms of artifice to mask to the broader 
community the similarity of the transaction to conventional forms of finance provides yet more 
evidence that Muslims in the modern era expect more functional relevance from contemporary 
Islamic financial practices. 
61. See Khurshid Ahmad, Foreword to MUHAMMAD NEJATULLAH SIDDIQUI, BANKING 
WITHOUT INTEREST 7 (rev. ed. Islamic Found. 1988) (1973) (describing a similar position as “de-
featist”); Mohammad Uzair, The Impact of Interest Free Banking, 3 J. ISLAMIC BANKING & FIN. 
39, 40 (1984) (describing the exemption of interest from the riba prohibition to be “apologetic”); 
see also COUNCIL OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY, CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ISLAMIC 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM app. 7 (1983) (indicating the presence of “complete unanimity among all 
schools of thought in Islam that the term riba stands for interest in all its types and forms”). 
62. See FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, 
RISK AND RETURN 87-88 (1998); IBN RUSHD, supra note 51, at 169–70 (1970). 
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wise been expanded through qiyas and purportedly sanctified through 
ijma to encompass astonishing levels of contemporary commercial risk, 
so that contracts cannot contain uncertainty over fundamental matters, 
such as, for example, a contract for the sale of an item not yet in exis-
tence.63 A fortiori, it has been argued, insurance contracts are per se in-
valid, given the uncertainty concerning not only the timing of the pay-
out, but indeed its very existence.64 Functionally, therefore, as currently 
construed the rule is entirely perverse; it requires individuals to enhance 
the levels of uncertainty and risk in their lives, purportedly on the basis 
of a verse whose purpose is to prohibit them from doing that. 
Thus, the flaws in the rigid Langdellian system are immediate and 
obvious.  These flaws prevent jurists from developing doctrine that 
achieves articulated broader societal interests. 
II. SHI’ISM’S ORGANIZATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY 
Sadr’s functional challenge in Iqtisaduna to the principles of modern 
Islamic jurisprudence is very much grounded in certain particularities of 
Usuli Shi’i religious thought concerning religious authority. A proper 
understanding of Sadr’s ideas, therefore, requires a certain familiarity 
with these background fundamentals and with Sadr’s life and works 
generally within the Usuli framework.65 
A. Shi’ism and the Imamate 
According to Shi’i legend, the Shi’i-Sunni schism originated in the 
question of successorship to the Prophet Muhammad. The Sunnis 
claimed that Muhammad specified no successor, and, therefore, Mu-
hammad’s proper successor was to be designated by the community. 
The Shi’a, shortened from Shi’at Ali, or the partisans of Ali, claimed 
                                                          
63. See 3 SANHURI, supra note 59, at 33-34. 
64. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 62, at 150. 
65. Because entirely irrelevant for the purposes of this Article, I make no attempt to evaluate 
the historicity of the legends described in this Part and instead merely engage them on their own 
terms. To understand Sadr’s ideas, the actual history of Shi’ism is considerably less important 
than the legends that have developed to explain the theology that Sadr and his fellow jurists pro-
pound. My selection of sources reflects this bias, relying on traditional accounts such as those of 
Moojan Momen and Allamah Tabataba’i to the exclusion of more rigorous historical versions. 
See MOOJAN MOMEN, A HISTORY OF SHI’I ISLAM, at xiv (1985) (“Critical scholarship has pro-
duced some interesting research on Shi‘i Islam, particularly concerning its early history and this 
has tended to throw considerable doubt on the traditional Shi‘i accounts. However, this re-
search…has had no impact at all on Shi‘i Islam itself, neither on the Shi‘i religious leaders nor on 
the Shi‘i masses.”). 
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that Muhammad, carrying out Divine Command, had clearly and un-
equivocally named his son-in-law Ali as his heir. The basis for the Shi’i 
claim was a hadith by Muhammad, disputed or interpreted differently 
by Sunnis, on a day known as Ghadir Khumm, in which he declared in 
one of his final sermons that whoever had accepted him as guardian of 
the Muslim community must now likewise accept Ali.66 The importance 
of the Ghadir Khumm hadith cannot be underestimated; to this day, the 
anniversary of Muhammad’s sermon at Ghadir Khumm is widely cele-
brated in nations with large Shi’i populations.67 
If viewed entirely as a political event, this celebration seems odd be-
cause Ali did not gain political power upon Muhammad’s death; rather, 
the Sunni claim that the community should decide prevailed and the 
first caliph, Abu Bakr, was granted political authority over the commu-
nity.68 Importantly, however, the Shi’i claim transcends the political in 
that the Shi’a consider Ali to be not only Muhammad’s legitimate po-
litical heir, but also a religious heir and the true source of knowledge 
(marja’ al-ilm) by virtue of his infallibility and his intimate connection 
to the Divine.69 Ali’s title among the Shi’a, therefore, was not simply 
caliph but Imam,70 selected by God and deemed uniquely capable of 
understanding not only what might be termed the “plain meaning” of 
the Qur’an, but its “hidden meaning” (ta’wil) as well.71 
The Imam is not a Prophet under Shi’i doctrine, in that he is not sent 
a Divine Book to supplant or supplement the Qur’an, but his religious 
authority, given his proximity to God, is clearly unique within the 
community.72 Nowhere within Sunni legend is there any suggestion that 
any religious or political authority has some sort of comparable ability 
to understand the Qur’an entirely.73 
                                                          
66. TABATABA’I, supra note 21, at 40. 
67. The author has himself witnessed large congregations in Iraq gathering throughout the 
anniversary of the Ghadir Khumm sermon to celebrate this event despite the fact that the day is 
not recognized as a national holiday. 
68. TABATABA’I, supra note 21, at 41, 44. 
69. Id. at 41–42. 
70. It is important to note that the term Imam is also used by Sunnis, and sometimes by Shi’a, 
to refer to a religious authority, particularly one who might be leading prayers. However, the no-
tion of Imam as an infallible authority who leads the community is uniquely Shi’i. See LESSONS 
IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 180–82. 
71. TABATABA’I, supra note 21, at 98–99; see also Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Preface to id. at 10 
(indicating that “[t]he distinctive institution of Shi‘ism is the Imamate and the question of the 
Imamate is inseparable from…the esoteric function of interpreting the inner mysteries of the Holy 
Quran and the Shari’ah”). 
72. See TABATABA’I, supra note 21, at 185–86. 
73. Shafi’i repeatedly insisted that the decisions of the Companions of Muhammad were not 
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Upon Ali’s death, a series of his lineal descendants succeeded him, 
with the line ending ultimately in the twelfth Imam, the Mahdi.74 The 
Mahdi disappeared into hiding in what is known as the Greater Occulta-
tion (ghaybat al-kubra), but remains alive and will reappear in the fu-
ture.75 Therefore, the Mahdi is the sole authority on earth capable of 
fully comprehending the Qur’an. However, because he has been in hid-
ing for more than a millennium, Shi’i Islam required some form of sub-
sidiary religious authority, if not to replace him, then to act as his dep-
uty in his absence. As the next section will show, it was the scholars of 
the law, currently known as the marja’iyya, who assumed this position 
in the modern era in the current manifestation of Shi’ism known as 
Usuli Shi’ism. 
B. Shi’i Religious Authority in the Modern Era 
1. Principles of Usuli Shi’ism 
Usulism, which came to dominate Shi’ism by the end of the eight-
eenth century,76 permits the exercise of interpretive effort on the part of 
jurists, known as ijtihad,77 on the basis of four sources of law remarka-
bly similar to those of Sunni Islam; namely, the Qur’an, the hadith, 
which encompass not only the actions and utterances of Muhammad but 
also those of the Imams, ijma and aql, or a form of logical reasoning 
similar to qiyas albeit without the analogical implications.78 To add fur-
                                                                                                                                      
sources of the shari’a in contradistinction to the hadith of Muhammad. See JOSEPH SCHACHT, 
THE ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE 16–17 (1950). Among the Companions were 
the most highly respected of Sunni Islam’s caliphs, the first four, also known as the “Rightly 
Guided.” DOMINIQUE SOURDEL & JANINE SOURDEL-THOMINE, A GLOSSARY OF ISLAM 143 
(Caroline Higgitt trans., Edinburgh Univ. Press 2007) (2002).  Logically implicit in Shafi’i’s con-
tention, therefore, is not only the idea that none of the caliphs carried any secret ability to under-
stand the Qur’an, but also that they were capable of error. 
74. The term “twelver” Shi’ism thus owes its origins to the number of Imams that Twelver 
Shi’is believe succeeded Muhammad. SOURDEL & SOURDEL-THOMINE, supra note 73, at 175. 
75. TABATABA’I, supra note 21, at 190–211 (providing an account of the twelve Imams). The 
Greater Occultation derives its name in juxtaposition to the Lesser Occultation that preceded it, 
which was a period of time during which the Mahdi was supposedly in hiding but nonetheless in 
contact with select deputies. Id. at 210–11. 
76. Usuli Shi’ism is usually contrasted with the other prominent form of Twelver Shi’ism that 
existed in the early eighteenth century, Akhbarism. Akhbaris generally believed that the exercise 
of ijtihad was forbidden to all but the Imam because humans are capable of error. MALLAT, supra 
note 5, at 28–30. 
77. For a more detailed treatment of ijtihad, see Section III.C.2, infra. 
78. HOSSEIN MODARRESSI TABATABA’I, AN INTRODUCTION TO SHI’I LAW 3–4 (1984). A 
paradigmatic example of aql is the “rule of correlation” (qaidat al-mulazama), pursuant to which, 
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ther similarity to the shari’a as developed by Shi’is and Sunnis, the 
hadith of the Imams often suspiciously track the conclusions of the 
Sunni jurists employing qiyas. For example, two schools of thought 
within Sunni Islam define the items that cannot be traded under the 
terms of the riba hadith as those measurable by weight and those meas-
urable by volume.79 The Shi’a reach this precise conclusion more di-
rectly; they report a hadith of the third Imam to the effect that items 
measured by weight and volume are subject to the prohibitions of riba.80 
As a result, in practical terms, the differences between Sunni jurists 
and Shi’i jurists in their contemporary derivation of shari’a are largely 
casuistic;81 both are exercises in Langdellian formalism. There has been 
increasing willingness, given this, to recognize traditional Shi’ism as 
simply another school of thought (madhab), akin to the four traditional 
schools of Sunni jurisprudence.82 
However, while the differences between the sects may be exceed-
ingly slight juridicially, the theological principles relating to the exis-
tence of an Imam do create considerable distance between them. The 
Shi’i jurist engaging in the interpretation of text is doing so in the hid-
den presence of an Imam who is himself almost an embodiment of the 
Law, and the jurist therefore acts in some sense as a caretaker for the 
Imam. The result is a clear bifurcation of authority within the Shi’i 
community between those capable of deriving the shari’a, known as 
mujtahids, or practitioners of ijtihad, who act as trustees for the Hidden 
Imam, and lay people, who are known as muqallids, or imitators.83 
Given the inherent authority of the Usuli Shi’i jurist as the Imam’s dep-
uty, a certain unique level of hierarchy and organizational structure fol-
                                                                                                                                      
among other things, the prerequisites of an obligatory act are deemed obligatory and the direct 
opposite of an obligatory act is deemed prohibited. 
79. 3 SANHURI, supra note 59, at 198. 
80. 5 MUHAMMAD IBN YA’QUB AL-KULAYNI, USUL AL-KAFI 146 (1985) (“Riba does not lie 
in what cannot be measured by weight or volume.”); see also 7 MUHAMMAD IBN AL-HASAN AL-
TUSI, TAHDHIB AL-AHKAM 118 (1981) (discussing Hadith of Third Imam that “everything meas-
urable by weight or volume may not be traded two for one if they are of the same genus”).  
81. MOMEN, supra note 65, at 184. 
82. See, e.g., CLARK B. LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT: THE 
INCORPORATION OF THE SHARI’A INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 82 n.2 (2006) (citing a 
1959 ruling by the rector of Al-Azhar, one of the premier centers of learning within Sunni Islam, 
suggesting that Shi’i legal opinions were as valid as legal opinions of the four Sunni schools). 
83. MALLAT, supra note 5, at 31. For ease of understanding, I refer to these “imitators” as 
“followers” or “laity.” It should also be noted that the bifurcation in Sunni Islam between muqal-
lids and mujtahids is an immensely different one, in that both are involved in a form of interpreta-
tion, whereas within Shi’ism, the muqallid is very much a lay follower not involved in any aspect 
of interpretation. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 22, at 94–96 (discussing the role of muqallids in 
classical Sunni Islam). 
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lowed. Specifically, under Usuli principles, each lay person was re-
quired to select a single, living mujtahid to “imitate.”84 The lay person 
was free to make his selection among the available mujtahids based on 
who he considered the most knowledgeable.85 He was then required to 
follow the rulings of the one mujtahid he selected without question.86 
Professor Mallat wisely explains the requirement of the living mujta-
hid as being related to the requirement of a continually creative juris-
prudence,87 but he may be discounting the political, social, and eco-
nomic dimensions of the issue. Mujtahids are involved in a fair amount 
of competition with one another for followers, and the followers are re-
quired under Shi’i rules to pay one tenth of their earnings less necessary 
expenses to the mujtahid as the Imam’s trustee.88 Permitting such pres-
tige and power to go to the dead in the place of the living hardly seems 
expedient from the point of view of the living mujtahids. 
Given the significant levels of control exercised by mujtahids over 
the community, Usuli Shi’i Islam needed to develop some sort of organ-
izational structure and system through which the process of “mujtahidi-
zation” could take place, or the system would promptly disintegrate as 
the numbers of self-proclaimed mujtahids multiplied and the followers 
selected whoever they wished among them or, alternatively, proclaimed 
themselves to be mujtahids. The system also needed to operate within a 
second constraint; it could not be enforced politically because the hier-
archy operated entirely independently of the state.89 What eventually 
developed as a result of the need for hierarchy that lay beyond the realm 
of the political were organized Shi’i centers of learning, primary among 
                                                          
84. MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL SADR, AL FATAWA AL WADIHA 21 (1977). 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. MALLAT, supra note 5, at 31. 
88. The rules regarding this obligatory payment, known as khums, further highlight the pre-
mier role of the Shi’i jurists within the community. A verse of the Qur’an orders the believers to 
pay from whatever “spoils” they acquire one fifth to Allah, Muhammad, Muhammad’s relatives 
and the poor and wayfarers. QUR’AN 8:41. Shi’i jurisprudence suggests somewhat implausibly 
that “spoils” refers to general earnings beyond necessary expenses and requires that 20% of these 
“spoils” be paid by followers in accordance with a set of rules. See e.g., SAYYID ALI HUSAINI 
SISTANI, MINHAJ AL-SALIHEEN, Introduction to ¶ 1212, available at 
http://www.sistani.org/local.php?modules=nav&nid=2&bid=22&pid=1926 (describing income 
from trade, industry, agriculture and possessions, along with other matters, as subject to the 
khums requirement). Half of the khums belongs to the Hidden Imam and half to the needy living 
descendants of Muhammad. Id. ¶ 1259; MALLAT, supra note 5, at 44–45. During the Greater Oc-
cultation, the first half, known as the sahm al-Imam, is to be given directly by the follower to his 
mujtahid, who will act as the Imam’s deputy and spend it on the Imam’s behalf. SISTANI, supra at 
1265. 
89. MALLAT, supra note 5, at 44–45. 
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them Najaf, the city in Iraq where the body of Shi’ism’s founder, Ali, 
lays buried.90 
2. The Role of the Mujtahids91 
The religious schools of Najaf were remarkable for their ability to 
meld a formal organizational structure onto an informal educational 
process within which hierarchy was never firmly established. On the 
one hand, the schools produced the mujtahids whose rulings were au-
thoritative on matters concerning the shari’a within the Shi’i commu-
nity.92 On the other hand, the marja’iyya confers no formal degree, and 
the attainment of the title of mujtahid is gradual, with the final stage be-
ing one of a final and absolute mujtahid, the marja al-taqlid (“marja’”), 
or source of imitation.93 Because there is no formal degree, there is no 
announcement that any particular scholar has become a marja’, though 
the Shi’i community is always aware of who the marjas are at any given 
time.94 
As a student rose, both in scholarly reputation and, upon achieving 
the level of marja al-taqlid, in the number of his followers that selected 
him as their mujtahid (and consequently paid him one tenth of their 
earnings), his rank rose as well.95 Two factors, therefore, controlled the 
rise of the putative jurist through this lengthy process that would exceed 
                                                          
90. See  id. at 38; Bernard K. Freamon, Martyrdom, Suicide, and the Islamic Law of War: A 
Short Legal History, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 299, 334–35 (2003). 
91. For ease of reference to the aspiring scholar, I cite most often in this section to the laud-
able work of Chibli Mallat in describing the functioning of the marja’iyya. I should note, how-
ever, that all of this has been confirmed by me during a two-year stay in Iraq from 2003 to 2005 
during which I held extensive conversations with various aspiring scholars in the Najaf seminar-
ies. 
92. Virtually all of the influential Shi’i scholars of the latter half of the twentieth century stud-
ied in Najaf, including Sadr, Ayatollah Khomeini, who led the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, 
and Grand Ayatollah Sistani, whose current influence in Iraqi political and civil affairs is consid-
erable according to virtually all political and religious authorities in Iraq with whom I spoke. See 
also MALLAT, supra note 5, at 59, 65 (concerning Sadr and Khomeini in Najaf); Corine Hegland, 
In Iraq, Sistani Is the Chess Master, NAT’L J., Apr. 17, 2004, at 1200–01 (concerning Sistani); 
note 214, infra. 
93. See MALLAT, supra note 5, at 42–44 (describing the process of “graduating” from Najaf 
seminaries); see also SADR, supra note 84, at 29 (describing the highest level of attainment). 
94. For example, there are currently four marjas’, commonly referred to as Grand Ayatollahs, 
in Najaf: Ali Sistani, Bashir Najafi, Ishaq Fayyad, and Muhammad Sa’eed Hakim. Virtually any 
pious Shi’i would be able to recite this list of four names, and certainly I have never heard any 
dispute about this. This is remarkable in light of the fact that there is no official process of ap-
pointment and that the sole manner in which the matter is determined is by consensus of the juris-
tic community. 
95. MALLAT, supra note 5, at 56. 
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two decades: his reputation within the marja’iyya and within the 
broader scholarly community and the willingness of followers to select 
him as their marja’.96 The laity therefore serves an important role in the 
process, essentially confirming and raising the stature of particular mar-
jas selected by the marja’iyya. 
Importantly, the mujtahids work largely in parallel with one another 
rather than in concert; no formal meetings are held by which decisions 
are agreed to, but rather each mujtahid develops his own rules and trains 
rising jurists in his own seminary.97 Inevitably, however, some form of 
coherence develops due to their centralization in Najaf and the dissemi-
nation of their ideas within the rarefied juristic community. Jurists are in 
necessary competition for followers, and a radical departure from the 
rulings of other jurists might not only impact the jurist’s reputation 
among his peers, but also lead to a substantial decrease in the number of 
devoted followers. As a result, the differences among jurists as to their 
understandings of the shari’a are relatively slight. 
3. The Rise of Sadr 
Born in 1935, Sadr rose rapidly through the scholarly ranks of Na-
jaf’s religious schools during a period of considerable tumult in Iraq, 
and he was quickly considered a successor to a Grand Ayatollah before 
he reached the age of 40,98 no small feat given the decades of learning 
normally required to attain the level of mujtahid.  The nation was at the 
time convulsed by a series of coups beginning in 1958, as a result of 
which political control of the country had shifted between and among a 
variety of secular parties, among them pan-Arabists (including the 
Ba’ath party of Saddam Hussein), communists, and Iraqi nationalists.99 
At least during the early part of this era, the marja’iyya was largely 
irrelevant to the political machinations and turned largely in on itself. Its 
mujtahids were devoting the bulk of their scholarly effort to developing 
what is known as a risala, or epistle, comprising the details of the 
shari’a, which often was little more than a recitation of the work of pre-
vious scholars and offered little opportunity for innovation.100 The focus 
                                                          
96. See id. at 39–41, 44–45. 
97. Id. at 39. 
98. See Mottahedeh, Introduction to LESSONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 
28–30. 
99. PHEBE MARR, THE MODERN HISTORY OF IRAQ 81–176 (2d ed. 2004); Aziz, supra note 
31, at 208–11. 
100. MALLAT, supra note 5, at 47–48. The risala remains the central work of the marja’, and 
it is hard to enter the home of any devout Shi’i in Iraq without finding the risala of his mujtahid, 
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of the risala was, and continues to be, on details concerning the rules of 
ritual.101 
The most prominent marja’ during Sadr’s youth, Muhsin al-Hakim, 
deplored political involvement and seemed to find some comfort in the 
relative isolation of the marja’iyya from the machinations of the profane 
world.102 Hakim sought, instead, protection for the Najaf scholars from 
political interference in exchange for relative political apathy.103 His in-
volvement in political affairs was limited to issuing some number of ju-
ristic opinions, or fatwas, of limited scope, such as his prohibition 
against joining the Communist party because of its atheism and his re-
fusal to meet with Iraq’s president unless he repealed a civil liberties 
law that Hakim considered unIslamic.104 As a result of this disengage-
ment, the Shi’i laity had grown increasingly disaffected with the 
marja’iyya and increasingly enamored of communism.105 Sadr’s revolu-
tionary mission was largely to reverse this trend and to make the 
marja’iyya of central relevance in the time of turmoil. His work was 
written in a largely accessible fashion, addressing, in addition to eco-
nomics, modern Shi’i notions of philosophy and logic in contrast to 
those of Marxism.106 He began to work towards reforming the seminar-
ies of Najaf as well by attempting to make them more structured, to use 
textbooks that were more accessible to beginning students, and to ex-
pand their curriculum beyond the arcane rules of the shari’a and the 
means by which the rules are derived.107 
Sadr also sought to become relevant politically. These aspirations 
were held in check as an initial matter while Hakim was the most senior 
                                                                                                                                      
which can be in excess of 10 volumes. 
101. See generally SISTANI, supra note 88 (providing part of the risala of Grand Ayatollah 
Sistani). 
102. Mottahedeh, Introduction to LESSONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 
28–29. 
103. Id.  There is some debate as to how politically involved Hakim was, with some pointing 
to actions taken by some of his closest confidants and associates concerning legal developments 
in Iraq after the 1958 coup.  See, e.g., MALLAT, supra note 5, at 15-16 (concerning opposition to 
legal reforms in the family law area); JOYCE N. WILEY, THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF IRAQI 
SHI’AS 46-47 (1992) (concerning deportation of Iraqi Shi’a and harassment of Shi’i seminarians).  
104. Aziz, supra note 31, at 209. 
105. MALLAT, supra note 5, at 36–37; Mottahedeh, Introduction to LESSONS IN ISLAMIC 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 28. 
106. See generally MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-SADR, FALSAFATUNA (1969) (English translation 
available at MUHAMMAD BAQUIR AS-SADR, OUR PHILOSOPHY (Shams C. Inati trans., The Mu-
hammadi Trust 1987) (concerning philosophy); MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-SADR, AL-USUS AL-
MANTAQIYYA LIL ISTIQRA’ (4th ed. 1977) (concerning logic). 
107. Mottahedeh, Introduction to LESSONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 29; 
Aziz, supra note 31, at 210–11. 
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cleric in Najaf largely because Hakim demanded in 1961 that Sadr dis-
tance himself from an Islamist political party that Sadr had himself 
founded three years earlier.108 However, after Hakim’s death and as 
Ba’ath control of Iraq began to consolidate, Sadr’s interest in politics 
and juristic political involvement increased. He wrote a series of works 
that explicitly called for a political revolution in Iraq and a form of ju-
ristic rule that the Ayatollah Khomeini would later use as a template for 
Islamic government in Iran.109 
Sadr’s political activism throughout the 1970s led to increasing diffi-
culties with the Ba’ath authorities in Baghdad, and his efforts to trans-
form the marja’iyya likewise met with increasing resistance.110 He 
sought to address these two problems through solidifying his reputation 
within the marja’iyya because he believed that the Baghdad government 
would never harm a mujtahid of sufficiently high standing and that re-
form of the institution was impossible unless he was of higher rank.111 
Thus, as his political difficulties were reaching a climax in 1977,112 
Sadr finally turned to the preparation of the first volume of something 
that he called Al-Fatawa al-Wadiha (The Clear Rulings), which resem-
bles a risala but by Sadr’s own admission omits the lengthy and cum-
bersome details that demonstrate the basis of the rulings in question.113 
Professor Mallat notes that Sadr’s failure ever to produce such a risala 
has been attributed to his premature death,114 but the explanation seems 
hardly convincing in the case of a jurist who had already written so ex-
tensively on so many other subjects. It seems Sadr had never thought 
very much of the risala; even the introduction to the Fatawa makes this 
amply, if implicitly, clear.115 A more likely explanation for Sadr’s delay 
is that Sadr felt that that the risala was largely irrelevant to the lay 
community, and thus devoted his efforts in other directions. Only when 
it became clear that his revolution and his life depended in part on the 
                                                          
108. Mottahedeh, Introduction to LESSONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 
29–30; Aziz, supra note 31, at 207–11. 
109. See MALLAT, supra note 5, at 69–78 (describing Sadr’s influence on the Iranian Consti-
tution and on Khomeini’s work, Wilayat al-Faqih). 
110. Mottahedeh, Introduction to LESSONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 31; 
Aziz, supra note 31, at 213–14. 
111. Aziz, supra note 31, at 213. 
112. Id. at 213–15. 
113. See generally SADR, supra note 84. 
114. MALLAT, supra note 5, at 13. 
115. SADR, supra note 84, at 11–14 (criticizing the risala for its lack of organization and its 
arcane terminology and suggesting that as a result it does not communicate effectively to the lay 
follower). 
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support of the marja’iyya did he finally turn to the preparation of a 
risala. In the end, however, the effort was in vain. Difficulties with the 
Ba’ath regime continued, particularly after Sadr’s support of 
Khomeini’s revolutionary efforts in Iran.116 In April of 1980, Saddam 
Hussein arrested Sadr along with his sister and executed them almost 
immediately.117 
III. THE DISCOVERY OF ISLAMIC ECONOMICS 
Sadr’s crowning achievement, Iqtisaduna, was written before Ha-
kim’s death in 1970 and thus before Sadr had an opportunity to develop 
his political thought because Hakim had expressly forbidden the 
younger Sadr’s extensive engagement in politics. As a result, Sadr 
seems eager in Iqtisaduna not to invite debate about political order. He 
thus only indicates that political authority will be exercised by a Holder 
of Command (Wali al-Amr), which is a popular Qur’anic term,118 with-
out providing the level of specificity that he later developed and that 
later inspired Ayatollah Khomeini in the development of his seminal 
work Wilayat al-Faqih, or Guardianship of the Jurist.119  This does not 
derogate from the revolutionary nature of Iqtisaduna. As will be dem-
onstrated, Iqtisaduna is a three part work with the first two parts dedi-
cated to a dissection of the principles of Marxism and capitalism, re-
spectively, and the third focused on what Sadr views as an entirely 
separate system, the Islamic economic system.120 The first two sections 
seem recycled and, with respect to the section on Marxism, respond in 
some detail to long discredited arguments concerning, for example, dia-
lectics and historical materialism.121 The third part of the work, concern-
ing Islamic economics, is by far the most interesting. 
A complete summary of Iqtisaduna, or even its third section, is well 
beyond the scope of this Article.122 I therefore present only a portion of 
                                                          
116. Aziz, supra note 31, at 214–17. 
117. Mottahedeh, Introduction to LESSONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 31. 
118. QUR’AN 4:59 (“O you who believe, obey God and his Apostle and the Holder of Com-
mand among you….”).  
119. See Section II.B.3, supra (discussing Sadr’s influence over the form of government Iran 
was to adopt). 
120. See generally IQTISADUNA, supra note 7. 
121. See, e.g., id. at 32–43 (responding at length to Marxist theories that at this time are no 
longer seriously engaged). 
122. It should also be noted that, despite the general brilliance of its author, Iqtisaduna suffers 
from such appalling organization that any competent summary would require extensive consid-
eration of how to present all of the ideas in some sort of coherent fashion. Professor Mallat has 
done an admirable job of something close to this in his work, The Renewal of Islamic Law, but 
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Sadr’s ideas in a manner designed to expose better the extent of Sadr’s 
radical approach towards a new form of social, cultural, and economic 
association in Islamic societies and the functional jurisprudence he uses 
to achieve this. The first subsection of this Part demonstrates how 
Iqtisaduna is functional in its very conception. The second outlines the 
neutral and objective role that shari’a was to play in the system, thereby 
distinguishing Sadr’s ideas from the Critical Legal Theory movement in 
the United States to which Professor Jackson has called attention. The 
third section reveals the extent to which Sadr seeks to reformulate 
shari’a along deeply functional lines and accept at some level a broad 
role for subjective ideological and political choice in the derivation of 
shari’a. Finally, the fourth section exposes Sadr’s theory in application. 
It shows how Sadr’s jurisprudence developed functional ideas on mutu-
ality in economic transactions that Sadr ascribed to the shari’a and that 
are certainly central to contemporary understandings of Islamic social 
and economic order. This section uses one example, Sadr’s proposed 
prohibition on hired labor, to provide logical coherence (if not practica-
bility) to this principle where Islamic economics and finance has hereto-
fore failed to articulate sensible ideals and objectives. 
A. Conceptions of Economic Order 
1. Delineation of Objectives 
Sadr indicates that Islamic economics is intended to serve three ob-
jectives: to ensure multiple ownership forms of property, to put in place 
limited economic freedom for commercial actors, and to achieve social 
justice in commercial affairs.123 By the mere process of identifying ob-
jectives, Sadr has already revealed a level of functionalism quite sur-
prising for those familiar with the work of comparable Shi’i jurists. A 
risala, for example, offers no such “objectives”; in its place are techni-
cal, specific, and thoroughly derived rules, often along with the bases 
for these rules as derived using the standard Langdellian means, but cer-
                                                                                                                                      
even he is forced to omit significant portions, and some of the disorganization of the work is ap-
parent from his descriptions. See MALLAT, supra note 5, at 113–41. 
123. IQTISADUNA, supra note 7, at 257. Sadr’s concern with social justice throughout 
Iqtisaduna is remarkable and has not gone unnoticed among commentators. Hamid Algar, for 
example, describes Sadr as having produced “[t]he most substantial treatment of the subject of 
social justice in Islam.” Hamid Algar, Introduction to SAYYID QUTB, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN ISLAM 
12 (John B. Hardie & Hamid Algar trans., rev. ed., Islamic Publ’ns Int’l 2000). 
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tainly no notion of a comprehensive system meant to achieve certain 
goals.124 
Moreover, in discussing his objectives, Sadr’s revolutionary aims be-
come clear.  He is careful to avoid any suggestion that his economic 
system is some sort of “blend” of Marxism and capitalism.125 He dis-
misses the notion that Islam mixes two foreign systems. Instead, he in-
sists on recognition of the Islamic system in its own right as “a genuine 
and original doctrine built on specific ideological bases, lying within a 
framework of specific understandings and values (qayyim) that are in-
consistent with the principles and bases and values and understandings 
upon which Marxism and capitalism are built.”126 This statement recalls 
almost precisely Unger’s assault on the objectivist notion that legal 
structure is logically derived from particular forms of human associa-
tion, which, Unger claims, manifest themselves in “the conceit that we 
must choose between market and command economies or at most com-
bine into a ‘mixed economy’ these two exhaustive and well-defined in-
stitutional options.”127 Sadr, like Unger, openly challenges these reduc-
tive assumptions and demands considerations of alternative structures 
clearly based on his own political and ethical norms. 
2. Doctrinal Theory of Economics 
While Sadr’s objectives-driven approach to economics was certainly 
radical from the outset, it is his methodology that constitutes a clearer 
assault on traditionalist notions of Langdellian formalism in the Islamic 
context. Sadr begins his description of his methodological approach 
with the suggestion that Islamic economics is a doctrine (madhab) de-
signed to serve the interests of human society within an overarching 
normative and religious framework that is specifically Islamic in char-
acter, central to which is a notion of social justice.128 The term madhab, 
commonly used to describe the schools of thought within the Langdel-
lian interpretive modalities, is very significant. Economics, to Sadr, is 
not a scientific method of explaining the realities of particular forms of 
human association or deriving the rules of human association through 
some form of quasi-scientific logic-driven reasoning, but is rather a 
                                                          
124. See, e.g., SISTANI, supra note 88. 
125. IQTISADUNA, supra note 7, at 256–57.  
126. Id. at 259. 
127. Unger, supra note 13, at 568. 
128. IQTISADUNA, supra note 7, at 264, 278–79 (concerning the central role of social justice 
and the position of economics within larger Islamic framework). 
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means of designing a set of rules to achieve particular objectives. This is 
the very essence of functionalism.129 
Thus, for example, Sadr dismisses the Marxist notion that historical 
and scientific forces of materialism will inevitably give rise to demands 
for equality that will ultimately require recognition.130 Sadr argues that 
the ambition for economic and social equality and social justice is ideo-
logical and normative and not merely a product of history. It was estab-
lished, he argues, by Muhammad in seventh century Arabia through 
hadith indicating that Arabs and non-Arabs alike will be judged by piety 
and not ethnicity, that all humans are children of Adam and that humans 
are as equal as “teeth on a comb.”131  Sadr, like Unger, is highly critical 
of “necessitarian theories of historical change—the belief that the con-
tent and sequence of social systems reflect inescapable economic or 
psychological imperatives.”132 By debunking this theory, Sadr, like 
Unger, seeks the establishment of a new social system based on differ-
ent normative understandings of human association.133 Moreover, and 
importantly, Sadr’s assault on traditionalist notions of logic-driven ju-
risprudence is distinctly Islamic in character and calls upon stories of 
Muhammad himself in an effort at legitimization. As a deeply commit-
ted jurist, Sadr does not seek to discard Islamic doctrine so much as re-
formulate it. 
                                                          
129. Id. at 291. 
130. Id. at 78–81. 
131. Id. at 301.  
132. Unger, supra note 13, at 577. 
133. See id. Much of the motivation for Sadr’s exposition on economics as doctrine and not 
science is to debunk the notion propounded by the Marxists of his day that historical forces drive 
political and economic developments according to ironclad laws of nature, thereby making eco-
nomics almost a form of natural science. See, e.g., IQTISADUNA, supra note 7, at 78–81 (respond-
ing at length to these assumptions as concerns power over the means of production). It also bears 
mentioning that Sadr’s relative ignorance of capitalist systems is partially betrayed in this section, 
as he incorrectly understands capitalist systems to justify themselves exclusively in the same po-
litical, normative, and ideological manner as he describes Islamic economics, rather than as 
uniquely in conformity with immutable and universal aspects of human nature. Compare id. at 
291 (describing the similarities of capitalism and Islamic economics as being ideologically driven 
and not scientific in nature), with Unger, supra note 13, at 576 (assailing the law and economics 
movement for developing doctrines that purport “to discover a canonical form of social life and 
personality that could never be fundamentally remade”). 
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B. Neutral Role for Shari’a in a Functional System 
1. Shari’a as Limitation 
Early in Iqtisaduna, Sadr indicates that the shari’a must play a role in 
curbing certain types of economic activity within the state, thereby sug-
gesting faith in an objective component to the shari’a separate from po-
litical and ideological debate. Sadr delineates two types of limitations to 
economic freedom that exist in his economic system, the first of which 
is internal to each individual actor, and the second external.134 Respect-
ing the internal limitation, Sadr, like Unger, believes that institutions 
and systems of human association affect human behavior.135 Unger, for 
example, suggests that the American system has been designed to fur-
ther the notion that in economic affairs humans are to act in the “harsh-
est self-interest” while as family members they do not.136 Unger argues 
that alternative forms that do not so starkly bifurcate between the per-
sonal and the commercial are possible.137 For Sadr, in a suitably de-
signed Islamic system, actors would not pursue their self-interest to 
such extremes either. Rather, their subjective impulses, informed by the 
ethos of the overarching Islamic system, would lead them to behave less 
avariciously.138 
Sadr is not so naïve, however, as to imagine that subjective impulses 
in a differently designed system would be entirely sufficient to rein in 
exploitative or rapacious conduct among all commercial actors in the 
commercial sphere. Much as Holmes saw the function of the law as be-
ing to constrain the “bad man,”139 Sadr invokes the external limitations 
of the law to supplement these internal limitations. The legal, external 
                                                          
134. Sadr’s terms in Arabic for the internal and external limitations, dhati and maudhu’i, are 
often translated, respectively, as “subjective” and “objective.” In fact, I later translate Sadr’s ex-
tensive use of the term dhatiyya as “subjectivity.” In this context, however, a similar translation 
would be inaccurate. As will be seen, Sadr’s two examples of external limitations are those im-
posed by a political leader and those imposed by the shari’a, and, quite clearly, the rulings of a 
political leader acting alone can hardly be described as “objective.” Rather, the idea is that, in 
Sadr’s words, the external limitations are “imposed by an outside force” in contradistinction to 
internal limitations, which “arise from the depths of the soul.” See IQTISADUNA, supra note 7, at 
260. 
135. See id. at 260–62; Unger, supra note 13, at 622–24. 
136. See Unger, supra note 13, at 622–24. 
137. See id. at 624–25. 
138. IQTISADUNA, supra note 7, at 260–62. 
139. See O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–60 (1897). 
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limitations take two forms, those of the shari’a and those implemented 
by the Holder of Command.140 
The limitations on economic activity imposed by the Holder of 
Command as political leader are to constrain private enterprise by exer-
cising a generally regulatory and supervisory authority in order to fur-
ther the broader public interest and the objectives of the Islamic eco-
nomic regime.141 The Holder of Command’s role, therefore, is akin to 
ordinary regulation and lawmaking, dominated as it would be by con-
ventional political considerations. 
These ordinary regulatory constraints, however, are limited by the 
higher law of the shari’a.142 The ordinary political process could result 
in lawmaking and regulatory authority intended to serve particular func-
tional ends, but the shari’a would impose limitations on that process, 
much as the Constitution imposes limitations on the regulatory and 
lawmaking authority of Congress. For example, Sadr indicates that the 
Holder of Command could not permit riba, fraud, or void the inheri-
tance law, but the Holder of Command could impose policies respecting 
the extraction of minerals, irrigation, and agriculture that do not conflict 
with the shari’a.143 
2. Shari’a as Signpost 
According to Sadr, the legal rules that underlie the economic system 
are similar to the top floor of a two story structure, with the economic 
principles being the bottom floor.144 To understand the system, one must 
examine the legal rules carefully, and from this, the economic policies 
and principles can be “discovered.”145 The shari’a thus serves an impor-
tant role in addition to providing the framework within which politics 
and lawmaking must operate; it is also the means by which broader eco-
nomic objectives are “discovered.” It therefore both constrains ordinary 
lawmaking while also providing the bases upon which Islamic policies 
may be found. 
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C. Functional Jurisprudence 
1. Assault on Formalist Hermeneutic Respecting the Scope of 
Hadith 
Though Sadr attributes a great deal of importance to shari’a, Sadr’s 
idea of shari’a is a functional one. Sadr immediately follows his disqui-
sition on objective limitations of the shari’a with evidence setting forth 
the entirely radical position that Muhammad’s adjudicatory (qadha’) 
rulings, as opposed to his religious (nahi) determinations, were not part 
of the shari’a and did not constitute limitations on the activities of a fu-
ture Holder of Command.146 
The consequence of Sadr’s position should not be gainsaid; it is a di-
rect and unambiguous assault on the sanctity of the most important 
source of law within the hermeneutic, the hadith. It effectively permits 
in many cases a Holder of Command to make a temporal political de-
termination entirely inconsistent with an action, statement, or utterance 
of Muhammad.147 Moreover, this position largely removes the restraint 
of the hadith in the context of commerce, where determinations of 
which hadith are religious in nature and which are regulatory or adjudi-
cative is almost impossible in many cases. That is, a jurist could be 
fairly certain that a hadith requiring the believers to pray in a particular 
manner related to Muhammad’s role as Divine Messenger, but how can 
one determine whether Muhammad’s prohibition against the sale of un-
caught fish,148 for example, was religious in nature or merely some sort 
of rule instituted by the Holder of Command relating to a practice that 
did not seem to be serving public interest at the time?  This distinction 
                                                          
146. Id. at 263–64. 
147. Sadr’s work was subject to rather vituperative attacks on this basis, among which were 
accusations of heresy. See MALLAT, supra note 5, at 143 (describing two critical reactions to 
Sadr’s work). That said, it is also representative of one of the most creative contributions of mod-
ernist Muslim intellectuals to the development of the shari’a in the contemporary era. Beyond 
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ing defects concerning the historicity of the hadith and suggesting that, because they seem to be 
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generalized “ethos” to which to adhere rather than a set of separate, permanently binding rules). 
148. See Section I.B, supra. 
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calls into question vast numbers of hadith that could alternatively be 
viewed as either regulatory or religious depending on the ideological bi-
ases of the interpreter. 
2. Role of Subjective, Ideological Choice in Deriving Shari’a 
The question therefore remains, in light of the important dual role the 
shari’a was to play as signpost and as limitation, precisely how to de-
termine the contours of the shari’a. If the content of the shari’a was as 
subject to ideological bias as it appeared to be absent certainty over the 
binding nature of the hadith, is there any objective and neutral process 
that could be utilized to determine what the rules of the shari’a are? 
Sadr struggles at length with this question, contrasting ijtihad, from 
which the mujtahid can objectively derive the shari’a, with subjectivity 
(dhatiyya).149 The term ijtihad has a long and storied history within both 
Sunni and Shi’i jurisprudential thought, but it is generally meant to sig-
nify the proper application of juristic effort to derive a legal rule. Thus, 
the term more than anything delineates parameters of interpretive le-
gitimacy without specifically defining them. Ijtihad leads to the proper 
set of legal rules whereas unfettered subjectivity is its opposite, either 
failure to develop the proper rules or the development of improper ones. 
Yet when describing what he dismisses as excessive subjectivity as 
opposed to ijtihad, Sadr falls immediately back onto his ideological bi-
ases. He identifies four subcategories of “subjectivity.” First, there is the 
justification of reality (tabrir al-waqi’), whereby a jurist mistakenly 
changes specific rules to fit contextual reality rather than altering that 
reality through the establishment of alternative forms of human associa-
tion.150 Sadr’s paradigmatic example of this type of subjectivity is an at-
tempt to exempt interest on debt from the prohibition of riba.151 A sec-
ond form of subjectivity involves a jurist evaluating a rule from a non-
Islamic framework with which he is familiar and ignoring that rule 
when not in accordance with the framework in question.152 Sadr’s ex-
ample here is the reluctance of some jurists to set limits on private own-
ership of property despite the existence of significant limitations within 
the shari’a, with no basis for failing to do so other than that it does not 
harmonize within a non-Islamic economic framework.153 Third, Sadr 
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indicates that jurists may subjectively divorce (tajreed) a rule from the 
social and political context in which it was made, thereby achieving a 
perverse result.154 For example, Muhammad may have failed to object 
to commercial activities wherein a laborer received a fixed wage rather 
than a share of profits, but the circumstances of Muhammad’s tacit ac-
ceptance in seventh century Medina could not possibly be extended into 
the world of twentieth century commerce, where miners in an oil com-
pany were extracting enormous amounts of wealth from the earth for the 
benefit of other parties without a right to any profit in the material ex-
tracted.155 The fourth and final type of subjectivity is prejudging the in-
terpretation of a text based on preconceived notions rather than objec-
tive ijtihad.156 Sadr’s example was of jurists who failed to distinguish 
between Muhammad’s role as Prophet and as judge and the implications 
concerning the binding nature of his speech depending on which role he 
was fulfilling.157 
Sadr’s categories hardly solve the problem of excessive subjectivity; 
if anything, they demonstrate what appears to be the unconstrained ma-
nipulability of doctrine. Sadr maintains, for example, that exempting 
bank interest from the riba prohibition is a “justification of reality,” 
Sadr’s first category of illegitimate subjectivity. A jurist more sympa-
thetic to the ideological and political principles underlying free market 
economics could almost as readily use Sadr’s classifications to argue 
that Sadr’s extension of riba into the realm of commercial bank debt 
was subjectively divorcing a rule from its social and political context 
(the third category of  subjectivity) and that, in suggesting that laborers 
must be entitled to a share in profits, Sadr was subjectively and illegiti-
mately ignoring a clear legal rule concerning the permissibility of hired 
labor that did not harmonize within his own conceptual framework (the 
second category of subjectivity). There does not appear to be any way to 
determine the proper use of ijtihad from the improper exercise of sub-
jectivity. 
It is a mark of Sadr’s brilliance that despite his considerable distance 
from debates of this kind in the American context, he fully grasps the 
consequences of his ijtihad-subjectivity theory and makes entirely clear 
that subjectivity and ideological choice are an inevitable part of inter-
pretation. Sadr argues that in deciding amongst competing interpreta-
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tions of Islamic sacred text, at times a subjective ideological choice is 
made that reflects the precise, Islamic form of human association the ju-
rist prefers.158 He thus proposes the radical notion that if a particular rul-
ing reached by other jurists appears to conflict with the functionality 
and goals of the economic system generally envisaged by the jurists, it 
would only be logical for the jurists to dismiss the ruling on that basis 
alone and adopt an alternative ruling.159 
Importantly, however, Sadr, unlike Unger, believes that objective, 
nonpolitical interpretation can exist despite the obvious and inevitable 
role of subjectivity.160 Indeed, the dual role that he places upon the 
shari’a, to inspire ordinary lawmaking even as it constrains it, requires 
some level of neutrality and distance from ideological and political 
choice to be taken seriously.161 Nevertheless, aside from his less than 
helpful four categories of subjectivity, Sadr is vague on setting the pa-
rameters of legitimate ijithad other than to say that it must fall within a 
set of “general rules” (al-shurut al-amma) that governs the exercise.162 
This creates a considerable amount of confusion as to precisely how the 
shari’a can function in the neutral and objective way that Sadr envi-
sions. 
D. Functionalism in Application—The Prohibition of Hired Labor 
The relaxation of Langdellian formalism was central to Sadr’s ability 
to make the economic system he described functionally coherent. Is-
lamic economics, as described by the vast majority of modern commen-
tators, by contrast, lacks such coherence. It has developed a theory of 
social order that is highly mutual in conception and that uses notions of 
mutuality to justify the two central prohibitions of traditionalist Islamic 
finance, those of interest and speculative risk without carrying them 
through to their logical conclusions. Essentially, the theory is that within 
any given transaction, the creation of circumstances where one party 
may earn a return while her partner in the same enterprise or endeavor 
may suffer a significant loss is damaging to social harmony and should 
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be prohibited.163 In the words of Sayyid Qutb, one of the most promi-
nent early theorists of Islamic economics:164 
Anyone who extends to me one dinar in order to receive a return 
of two dinars from me is my enemy; I will not wish him well, nor 
can I regard him in amity. Mutual support (ta’awwun) is one of 
the fundamental principles of Islamic society, but riba destroys 
this sentiment and weakens its foundations. For this reason does 
Islam despise riba.165 
A similar position is maintained with respect to the prohibition against 
excessive speculation; the potential gain is unearned, in the sense that it 
is acquired solely at the expense of other parties to the endeavor, which 
is destructive to social harmony.166 
This position devolves into incoherence, however, when the Langdel-
lians that dominate Islamic finance insist on the permissibility of hired 
labor because Muhammad seems to have at least implicitly approved the 
practice under the doctrine of ‘ijara, or rent for hire.167 Hired labor quite 
obviously does not involve values such as mutual help and fellowship. 
As a general, conceptual matter, hired laborers, like creditors, earn a 
fixed return that is not related to the success of the venture. The em-
ployer is legally required to pay its employees wages even if the em-
ployer suffers losses, and the employer is not legally obligated to pay 
more if the employer’s profits are unusually large.168 In Sadr’s context, 
a large amount of hired labor was devoted to the oil industry, and Sadr 
believed that very high profit levels were likely to be maintained for a 
considerable period of time in that industry.169 As a result, Sadr clearly 
thought that the fixed return in the labor context was to the detriment of 
the party receiving it, in this case the laborer, and, in any event, in his 
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view, the practice was violative of the mutuality principle and his own 
ideas of social justice and deserved abrogation. 
Sadr removed the inconsistency with respect to mutuality in em-
ployment, at least in the context of mining for precious minerals, by 
prohibiting hired labor, but, given the existence of a hadith suggesting 
the permissibility of hired labor, he required a willful abrogation of the 
traditionalist interpretive system to do this. He simply indicated that the 
rule permitting hired labor was taken out of context, that seventh cen-
tury Medina did not permit labor to be sold in the manner that it is in 
contemporary society in the context of precious mineral mining, and 
that, in any event, the Prophetic permissibility could be without basis 
despite ample authority in support of it.170 Given Sadr’s theory, dis-
cussed above, that determinations of other jurists could be ignored if 
they did not fit well within the functionality of an Islamic economic 
framework, this conclusion would not be difficult for Sadr to reach no 
matter how much juristic authority existed to oppose it. 
In the end, Sadr’s revolution proved to be a failure. Islamic finance 
has abandoned its revolutionary economic roots, even in the one state 
that was most enamored of Sadr’s ideas, Iran.171 Sadr’s role, however, 
in bringing the jurists back from irrelevancy in the economic sphere 
should not be understated. The impact of Iqtisaduna has been extraordi-
nary and the work has played a significant role in Islamic economic and 
financial revivalism in many Muslim societies.172  Whether this momen-
tum can be sustained depends on the extent to which Sadr’s revolution-
ary ideas, properly understood, can be suitably adapted to serve the con-
temporary era in a considerably less ambitious manner. If it cannot, then 
Islam will, instead, return to increasing irrelevancy in the commercial 
context through its continued insistence on Langdellianism. Before ad-
dressing the basis for adapting Sadr’s jurisprudential flexibility to the 
contemporary era, however, I first turn to Professor Jackson’s compari-
sons of Islamic interpretive theory to Unger’s version of Critical Legal 
Theory, in order to lay the groundwork for a more complete explanation 
of Sadr’s theory on the nature of shari’a. 
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IV. UNDERSTANDING THE JURISPRUDENTIAL IDEAS OF IQTISADUNA 
A. Alternative Approaches to Sadrism 
Professor Jackson’s groundbreaking thesis that Islamic interpretive 
theory may not be the source of any Islamic doctrine but rather the 
source of its validation has some resonance in Sadr’s context. This Arti-
cle has already demonstrated some modest similarities between Unger’s 
theories, explored at length by Professor Jackson,173 and Sadrist ideo-
logically-driven economic philosophy. Professor Jackson’s essay moves 
from Unger to examine Islamic doctrine in comparison to the work of 
Professor Fish, who has argued that doctrine merely validates precon-
ceived political and ideological presuppositions and biases and that the 
extent to which a particular interpretation is viewed as valid is merely 
an indication of its rhetorical strength and its level of harmonization 
with commonly accepted and entirely contextual understandings, norms, 
and objectives.174 
Jackson’s implicit claim, given his invocation of theorists who deny 
any notion of objectivism in legal interpretation, seems to be that no ob-
jectivity is to be found in the interpretation of Islamic texts. I do not ad-
dress this matter, however, as I find little benefit to revisiting a debate in 
the Islamic context that has been exhaustively conducted among Ameri-
can scholars of jurisprudence. More importantly for purposes of this Ar-
ticle, however, there is virtually nothing to be gained from this approach 
as a prescriptive matter. The analysis cannot plausibly be extended to 
address doctrinal reform. There are two possible prescriptive positions 
that could be developed from Jackson’s approach and both are laden 
with substantial difficulties. 
The first approach would be to adopt Unger’s thesis that doctrine is a 
means of illegitimately narrowing ideological, ethical, and political ar-
gument. The logical consequence would then be to seek to expand doc-
trinal debate beyond its currently narrowing confines through a cease-
less attack on any notion of neutrality and objectivity in the process of 
legal interpretation or on any suggestion that there is a sphere within 
which the legal process operates that is separate from the political. Pro-
fessors Dorf and Issacharoff point out that a similar approach is less 
than effective in the American context to those interested in having their 
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views considered by the institutions involved in adjudication.175 They 
indicate, for example, that a “radical” legal realist could not logically 
criticize the decision of Bush v. Gore as excessively political because 
under the paradigm of that type of realist, the institution would only be 
acting in the overtly political manner that, according to such a theorist, 
it always did.176 Moreover, none on the Court would be likely to take 
this type of broad and universal criticism seriously, as it would under-
mine altogether the work they were doing.177 Dorf and Issacharoff con-
clude that these sorts of attacks may delegitimize institutions, some of 
which may well deserve to be delegitimized in this manner, but any 
academics more interested in serving a “checking” function that might 
influence the Court in a more positive direction would do well to es-
chew such an approach in favor of more “sympathetic” criticism.178 
Surprisingly, Jackson does not seem to realize the extent to which an 
approach that calls upon the ideas of Unger and Fish necessarily dis-
misses and delegitimizes as delusional exercises in “transcendental non-
sense”179 efforts of Islamic scholars and jurists of virtually any persua-
sion to interpret religious text faithfully and objectively. Jackson 
concludes his essay with the hope that those who might view his work 
as “juristic nihilism” realize that law and the government upon which it 
is based is “no better, no worse, no more and no less Islamic, than the 
men and women who authenticate them.”180 It is hard to imagine that 
any jurists would subscribe to the view that the Qur’an carries no sepa-
rate and independent meaning of its own of any kind and that it is there-
fore in need of juristic “authentication.” Dorf and Issacharoff correctly 
note that the Supreme Court is not likely to be influenced by those that 
delegitimize it as an institution, but it is even more difficult to believe 
that very many Muslims, jurists or otherwise, who take Islamic doctrine 
seriously will be swayed by an approach that strips their holy texts of all 
objective, legal meaning and supplants in their place ideological, politi-
cal, and ethical presuppositions and biases that would exist irrespective 
of whether or not Revelation ever happened. 
The other prescriptive position that could be developed from Jack-
son’s work would lean less towards Unger’s ideas and more towards 
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those of Fish. This position would suggest that while doctrine, and the 
legal theory under which it is developed, may be everything that Unger 
decries, its role in seeking to limit and defuse ethical and political de-
bate within any social construct is in fact beneficial to social harmony. 
This benefit of the law, however, presupposes a certain level of decep-
tion of the believers, in that legal theory would hardly serve the role of 
defusing debate if everyone knew perfectly well it was simply rhetori-
cally enhanced political argument. This places the commentator seeking 
to move Islamic doctrine into more positive directions in a dilemma. 
The commentator could indicate that Islamic legal theory was rhetorical 
etiquette, in which case the commentator’s position would be disre-
garded for the reasons set forth in the previous paragraph, and, to the 
extent it was not, the commentator would destroy the salutary role that 
doctrine is supposed to fill. Alternatively, eager to preserve this salutary 
role of doctrine, the commentator could make criticisms of doctrine 
without disclosing her underlying conviction that the doctrinal positions 
cannot possibly be derived from legal theory. This approach is deeply 
problematic, however, and seems insultingly patronizing to those who 
endeavor mightily and sincerely to understand God’s word as objective 
and neutral reality and not the product of “authentication.” 
B. Shari’a and the Interpretive Community 
In the absence of the marja’iyya, Sadr’s ideas seem to be less than 
persuasive and, if anything, an implicit vindication of Professor Jack-
son’s views. Sadr insists on an objective, neutral and nonpolitical role 
for the shari’a both to inspire legislation as well as to constrain it, but 
then subsequently demolishes a series of received notions concerning 
hadith that might help establish some form of quasi-scientific objectiv-
ity in the jurisprudence. He acknowledges the influence of subjective 
ideological and ethical conviction, but insists that ijtihad has a role to 
play through the imposition of unspecified “general rules” that will 
guide the interpretive process. The result is largely salutary, a functional 
jurisprudence that achieves recognizable social ends, but seems, if any-
thing, to fortify the position that the shari’a can have no certain neutral, 
nonpolitical and nonideological content given the absence of any basis 
upon which such neutrality might lie. 
The existence of an institution, however, that acts as the Hidden 
Imam’s deputy and is therefore the caretaker of the shari’a leads to an 
entirely different conclusion. Sadr clearly accepts some role for subjec-
tivity and dismisses any necessitarian notion that the law can be derived 
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like a science, but he believes that the marja’iyya can reformulate the 
jurisprudence along functional and ideological lines, redefine the goals 
of the shari’a, and then place objective and neutral bounds on the inter-
pretive process to ensure continued adherence to these goals. Contrary 
to the reductive and verifiably false cliché that religious law cannot be 
amended because it is written by God, Sadr seeks to persuade the 
marja’iyya to adopt precisely such an amendment through a new under-
standing of which Prophetic statements, utterances, and tacit accep-
tances are a binding part of the shari’a and which parts are not. More-
over, he reworks doctrine substantially to create a new understanding of 
the shari’a principles that is deeply functional, communitarian, mutual-
istic, and egalitarian in its nature and that emphasizes those elements of 
Islamic history that focus on ideals of mutuality, egalitarianism, and so-
cial justice. He is entirely aware that his theories on their own are 
largely the subjective ideological convictions of a scholarly revolution-
ary. When these convictions are, however, adopted by the institution 
that acts in the absence of the infallible Hidden Imam, they become the 
shari’a under the rules of Shi’ism, with the marja’iyya then establishing 
the objective and neutral bounds within which the interpretive process 
would operate to derive further and more specific constraining interpre-
tive rules in pursuance of it. 
Sadr’s approach, despite its obvious heterodoxy, is deeply Islamic in 
nature. Sadr claims that the objectives he delineates can be found in the 
classical period of Islamic history in the form of fairer rules of eco-
nomic association. They owe their origins, he argues, to statements of 
Muhammad relating to the equality of human beings. It is a highly styl-
ized narrative, in other words, in which Islamic principles are invoked 
to overhaul Islamic doctrine and the traditionalist Islamic approach to 
jurisprudence, much in the manner that President Lincoln, for example, 
grounded his norms and principles of equality in America’s dawn as set 
forth in the Declaration of Independence.181 
Seen in this light, Sadr’s claims to history are entirely sensible. Pro-
fessor Mallat criticizes Iqtisaduna for its ahistoricity concerning the im-
portance of egalitarianism and social justice in Islamic history,182 but 
this is beside the point. Sadr is aware of the historical evidence of pov-
erty and exploitation in the classical period; he does not seek to deny 
it,183 so much as tell a compelling and transformational narrative that 
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emphasizes and highlights a particularly egalitarian strain of jurispru-
dence that focuses on social justice, the origins of which clearly lie in 
Islam’s dawn. President Lincoln, we may assume, was well aware when 
delivering the Gettysburg address that the words he uses to denounce 
slavery were taken from a document written by a slaveowner, but this 
does little to detract from his claim that the proposition that all men 
were created equal comes not from him, but from the document that de-
clared the United States a free and independent nation. The respective 
narratives may be stylized and ahistorical, but they are powerful none-
theless. 
In the end, Sadr’s faith in the marja’iyya acting as the infallible 
Imam’s deputy liberates him from Langdellian legal science and allows 
him to espouse such radical jurisprudential notions. The same cannot be 
said, however, for his counterparts in Sunni Islam, with its absence of 
comparable jurists of equivalent theological stature in the contemporary 
period. As a result, within the Sunni world, the notion of bias or ideo-
logical presupposition in the interpretation of text is inherently more de-
stabilizing. 
It is to Professor Jackson’s credit that he has identified precisely this 
problem of the absence of an authoritative interpretive community in his 
extensive work in the Sunni context. For example, Professor Jackson 
correctly notes that the feminist scholar Fatima Mernissi has presented 
an interpretation of Islamic text and history concerning the rights of 
women that could be seen as plausible and yet radically different from 
traditional interpretations.184 In the absence of an authority, it is difficult 
to determine which interpretation would be deemed more legitimate. 
Professor Jackson’s work demonstrates convincingly that Sunni Islam 
addressed this problem at the end of the first millennium through a pro-
hibition against the exercise of interpretive effort to derive alternative 
rules from foundational text and the consecration of particular schools 
of thought (madhahib)—the fabled “closing of the door of ijtihad.”185 
The intent was not to prevent the evolution of doctrine at all, but, as 
Jackson suggests, to establish particular schools of authority to which 
doctrine had to refer to establish its legitimacy.186 
In any event, the dissolution of the schools of thought in the Sunni 
world has led to considerable confusion and uncertainty, resulting in a 
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preoccupation by Sunni Islamic movements with efforts at codification 
of supposedly historic rules, so that interpretive control is provided by a 
text rather than an institution.187  Sunni theorists engaging in Islamic 
economics have, in light of this, demonstrated considerable reluctance 
in developing functional jurisprudence despite their inherently func-
tional objectives.  The militant Sayyid Qutb, for example, in an earlier 
edition of his work on economics and social justice, allowed for a com-
paratively large role for masalih al-mursala, or public interest, in devel-
oping jurisprudence, but he later removed much of this.188  Qutb’s reluc-
tance to engage in open-ended, potentially useful interpretive techniques 
no doubt stems from his inherent distrust of jurists. In some of his 
works, he openly muses about the possibility that a juristic community 
could betray what he regarded as true Islamic doctrine.189 To allow ju-
rists to develop the shari’a with such expansive interpretive tools as 
public interest was thus dangerous to Qutb in a manner that it was not to 
Sadr. 
In short, Qutb had no faith in his interpretive community, and this 
hampered his ability to call for a similarly reformulated jurisprudence. 
Instead, he insisted on the necessity of a functionally distinct Islamic 
economic system with comparatively little explanation of the jurispru-
dential means by which it might arise.190 This flaw found itself repli-
cated in the practice of Islamic finance, where, like Qutb, proponents 
preach fairness and social justice endlessly, but, when forced to apply 
the formalist methodologies in a manner that Qutb was never required 
to, fall back upon a traditionalist and formalist practice in which these 
functional concerns play an exceedingly minor role. 
V. WHITHER ISLAMIC FINANCE? 
While a purely descriptive analysis of the jurisprudential origins of 
Islamic economics may have merits on its own, a question does remain 
as to whether there is anything that might be learned from Sadr’s theo-
ries that has relevance in the contemporary world. I maintain that there 
is considerable room to reform Islamic finance along the functional 
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lines envisaged by Sadr so as to make the practice more relevant and 
salutary to the lives of contemporary Muslims. 
A. Current Practice 
Currently, in the words of the eminent Islamic theorist Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr, Islamic economics is “caught in the intellectual web of 
the very system it set out to replace” and is no longer a truly independ-
ent discipline, defining itself almost exclusively with reference to its 
Western counterpart.191 The sole remnant of the Islamic economy lies in 
the area of Islamic finance, which does not seek social, cultural, and 
economic revolution, but rather preaches a narrow adherence to tradi-
tionalist notions of the shari’a solely in the banking sector.192 Given the 
substantial difficulty of maintaining a financial institution that neither 
took interest on commercial loans nor engaged in the types of commer-
cial uncertainty banned by the doctrine of gharar, Islamic financial in-
stitutions have fallen back upon stratagem and artifice in order to func-
tion, of which two large and illustrative examples are the murabaha and 
takaful. 
The murabaha is an Islamically permissible form of short-term fi-
nancing designed to avoid interest wherein the financial institution 
agrees to purchase an item on behalf of a client and then sell it to the 
client on the basis of an agreed markup, with payment always coming at 
                                                          
191. See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamization of Knowledge: A Critical Overview, 30 
ISLAMIC STUD. 387, 388 (1991); see also El-Gamal, supra note 3, at 123. 
192. ROY, supra note 32, at 140–41. Roy also notes that in some nations, particularly Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan, a conservative trend always existed among some jurists to remake the bank-
ing sector along largely formal lines rather than transform the societies of the Muslim communi-
ties in which they operated. See id. This may well be true at some lower level, but the dramatic 
influence of the revolutionaries on the rise of Islamic finance cannot be gainsaid. For example, in 
the case of Pakistan, one of the two nations where this more conservative brand of Islamic finance 
developed, the nation’s most influential Islamist, Syed Abul Al’a Mawdudi, was an unabashed 
revolutionary. See note 3 and accompanying references, supra. In addition, one of the most popu-
lar and prominent defenders of contemporary Islamic finance in Pakistan, Judge Usmani, speaks 
extensively on the social justice issues raised by Mawdudi in the context of finance. Compare 
SAYYED ABULALA MAUDOODI, ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF MAN AND ITS ISLAMIC SOLUTION 27–
28 (M. Abdul Waheed Khan trans., 2d ed. 1955), with MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE 9–10 (2d ed. Kluwer Law Int’l 2002) (1998) (each discuss-
ing the manner in which bank interest is a cause for unjust wealth disparities). Umar Chapra, an-
other outspoken advocate of the role of social justice in Islamic finance, was employed by the 
Islamic Research Institute of the Islamic Development Bank, which operates in Saudi Arabia. See 
generally UMAR CHAPRA, TOWARDS A JUST MONETARY SYSTEM (1985). Saudi Arabia is Roy’s 
second example of a nation that espouses a distinctly formalist approach to Islamic finance. See 
also El-Gamal, note 3, at 122 (describing the revolutionary Islamic economic movement as being 
the genesis of Islamic finance). 
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a later time and the markup always reflecting a prevailing interest 
rate.193 If, as is often the case, the item in question was readily fungible, 
such as the stock of a large and relatively stable corporation, the trans-
action resembled a debt transaction in all but form. In a particularly 
egregious and increasingly popular form of murabaha financing known 
as tawarruq, the asset in question is a commodity that is resold to an 
original seller. The borrower “buys” the commodity from an Islamic fi-
nancial institution which itself bought it from the original seller. The 
borrower then incurs an obligation to pay for the commodity in the fu-
ture an amount that reflects the prevailing interest rate, and then simul-
taneously sells the commodity back to the original seller at the price it 
was originally sold, less fees.194 The commodity might not have even 
left the original seller’s possession. By one commentator’s recent esti-
mate, as much as 95% of the investments of Islamic financial institu-
tions take the form of the murabaha.195 
Takaful is the formal means by which insurance is conducted not-
withstanding the Islamic prohibition against gharar. Takaful derives 
from the determination by some scholars that gratuitous contracts are 
not subject to the gharar prohibition.196 Pursuant to takaful, a group of 
Muslims agrees to protect one another in the case of casualty or loss by 
“gratuitously” pooling their resources through making regular, contrac-
tually required payments in the form of premiums to be invested in 
Islamically acceptable commercial products.197 When a casualty or loss 
occurs, the participants each “gift” a portion of the premiums (and any 
undistributed profits) theretofore collected to the bearer of the loss pur-
suant to the terms of a binding contract.198 Whether this exercise in art-
ful semantics can be described as formalist is highly questionable; there 
                                                          
193. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 62, at 140–41. 
194. Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Limits and Dangers of Shari’a Arbitrage,   
http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~elgamal/files/Arbitrage.pdf at 9 (last visited Oct. 9, 2007) (describing 
this as a prevalent practice within the banks of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a coalition of six 
Arab nations located in the Persian Gulf region that includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the 
United Arab Emirates). 
195. See IBRAHIM WARDE, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 133 (2000). It 
should be noted that some formalists are not entirely comfortable with the especially transparent 
forms of murabaha, involving, for example, fungible products, entirely simultaneous transfers, or 
tawarruq. See, e.g., USMANI, supra note 192, at 152–53 (describing the murabaha as “border-
line”); El-Gamal, supra note 3, at 128. 
196. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 62, at 151–52. For a classical reference, see 2 IBN RUSHD, 
supra note 51, at 361 (“[A]ll which cannot be sold legitimately from the standpoint of gharar 
[may be gifted].”). 
197. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 62, at 151–52. 
198. Id. 
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is little other than terminology that separates the takaful from conven-
tional forms of insurance. 
Despite this highly formal practice which relies on such artifice, the 
language of Sadr and Qutb respecting mutuality, social justice, and fair-
ness in Islamic financial practice is widely repeated by large numbers of 
the defenders of Islamic finance, suggesting that the desire for achieve-
ment of the original functional objectives of the revolutionaries remains 
strong within the Muslim community.199 
I have written elsewhere about the several problems arising from 
formalist practice.200 These include hypocrisy by proponents who em-
phasize the importance of mutuality, partnership, and fairness in finance 
and commerce and then employ practices such as tawarruq.201 There 
has, in addition, been a failure to develop a formalist solution to many 
existing commercial problems, which are currently addressed by con-
tracting in violation of the shari’a and selecting New York or English 
law to govern the supposedly “Islamic” transaction.202 Professor El-
Gamal adds others, such as the fact that the extensive and sophisticated 
multiparty transactions necessary to sustain tawarruq transactions re-
semble those of money launderers and terrorist financiers and therefore 
are easily susceptible to dangerous forms of abuse.203 
                                                          
199. See Kuran, supra note 11, at 173, 174 (describing the prohibition of interest, grounded 
on the principle of fairness, as being “the most celebrated” injunction in Islamic economics 
among the proponents of the discipline). 
200. See Hamoudi, supra note 39, at 615–19. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 618 (citing Umar F. Moghul & Arshad A. Ahmed, Contractual Forms in Islamic 
Finance Law and Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems N.V. & Ors.: 
A First Impression of Islamic Finance, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 150, 189–90 (2003)); see also 
VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 62, at 144–50. 
203. See El-Gamal, supra note 194, at 11–12. The most prominent functionalist addressing 
the topic of Islamic finance has been Professor El-Gamal, who has admirably argued for a mutual 
structure for Islamic banks and insurance schemes wherein the policy holders or the depositors, as 
the case may be, are themselves the owners of the nontransferable shares of the institution to the 
extent of their deposits or policies. See, e.g., Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Mutuality as an Antidote to 
Rent-Seeking Shari’a-Arbitrage in Islamic Finance (2005),  
http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~elgamal/files/Mutuality.pdf [hereinafter Mutuality]. Professor El-Gamal 
argues that the mutual form helps serve what he calls the “spirit” of the riba and gharar restric-
tions, namely avoidance of inequity and excessive risk taking in commercial transactions, because 
mutual structures are not exclusively designed to maximize profit for shareholders at all costs and 
so are less likely to induce managers to take excessive risks given that there is no stock price that 
will rise or fall as a result of any actions they take. See id. at 5–7. El-Gamal does not object to the 
formalism that infects the current practice; indeed, he argues for its expansion to deal with the 
deposit side of the institution as much as its asset side, see El-Gamal, supra note 3, at 136, but he 
wants to see in the process the banks achieve what he views as the ultimate purposes of the 
shari’a, which he regards as more important than merely using artifice to evade restrictions. Mu-
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The central, ontological problem, however, is that the roots of Islamic 
finance very much lie in the functional revolution espoused by Sadr and 
others, and it is hard to see how Islamic finance could retain its legiti-
macy if it were to abandon these objectives altogether. In that case, Is-
lam would not be articulating a space within which forms of human as-
sociation were more mutual, communitarian, humane, and just. Rather, 
Islam would be slavishly following the functional objectives of financi-
ers and commercial actors everywhere and using its energies to ensure 
that whatever objectives were articulated by them were suitably ad-
justed in form to serve the Langdellian modalities. This would be en-
tirely inconsistent with the oft-heard Muslim cliché that Islam repre-
sents “a comprehensive and all-encompassing code of life.”204 Under 
the Langdellian hermeneutic, Islam would not be a code or way of life 
but an annoying externality to be minimized and a trivial obstacle to be 
circumvented after all of the important decisions concerning ethics and 
ideal types of human association and social organizations have been 
made. Whether this could survive in the long term is highly question-
able. It was Sadr’s revolution that brought the jurists back from irrele-
vancy, and the resurgence of Langdellianism seems destined to consign 
them once again to it. 
                                                                                                                                      
tuality, supra at 5–7. El-Gamal’s work is bold, noteworthy and, as a sophisticated and thoughtful 
analysis of the necessity of functionalism in Islamic finance, largely unprecedented. El-Gamal’s 
unwillingness as an economist, however, to discuss notions of jurisprudence extensively leaves 
some noticeable gaps in his ideas. It is one thing to say that mutual structures accord with the 
“spirit” of the doctrines of riba and gharar more harmoniously than do for profit structures, but it 
is difficult to see, absent a functional jurisprudence, how such vague notions of “spirit” could 
translate into doctrine. Given El-Gamal’s implicit acceptance of Islamic finance artifice as com-
plying with the letter of shari’a, a bank could just as easily comply with Islamic doctrine by more 
extensive artifice. Professor El-Gamal rightly notes that such a bank differs so little from a con-
ventional bank that it is difficult to see what purpose it would have, something I have repeated 
elsewhere in my own work. See Hamoudi, supra note 39, at 616 (suggesting that an openly for-
malist approach to Islamic finance that fails to articulate broader societal interest could “doom the 
practice”). But the point is broader than one of mere utility; the difference between a formalist 
Islamic bank and a functionally distinct financial institution at the doctrinal level must be more 
sophisticated than that both are equally Islamic but that one merely conforms better to the “spirit” 
of the shari’a. Surely the jurisprudence needs to reflect and espouse the functionalism implicit in 
Professor El-Gamal’s invocation of the “spirit” of the shari’a in order to serve its purposes effec-
tively and, by so doing, reject the Langdellian formalism that is characteristic of contemporary 
applications of shari’a. 
204. See, e.g., Muhammad Shoaib Omar, Introduction to MUFTI MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, 
CONTEMPORARY FATAWAA 17 (Muhammad Shoaib Omar ed., 2001). 
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B. A Revolution Revised 
Adapting Sadr’s revolution in a manner that will permit Islamic fi-
nance to serve its central ontological function of an Islamic form of so-
cial justice in commercial association requires some alteration at both 
the political and the institutional levels. Such changes are readily 
achievable, but do require a significant narrowing of the scope of Sadr’s 
vision from a revolutionary economic sphere of association to more 
voluntary forms of commercial and financial conduct governed by Is-
lamic rules. 
With respect to the political question, Iqtisaduna envisioned some 
form of juristic political rule to ensure that the forms of human associa-
tion it proposed would be enacted as binding law. Sadr became more 
enamored of juristic political rule as time progressed.205 He did consider 
the possibility of a financial institution that operated on Islamic princi-
ples in the absence of juristic rule and even devoted a book to this sub-
ject.206 However, in describing such a bank, which in many ways re-
sembles the Islamic financial institutions that currently operate, he 
presciently acknowledged that its ability to serve central Islamic objec-
tives would be limited, and he clearly envisioned it as some sort of tem-
porary and limited measure on the road to juristic rule.207 
There are numerous problems involving juristic rule that this Article 
can only mention in brief. First, the one example in the Shi’i context is 
Iran, which, given its substantial problems, seems to be evidence 
enough of the danger of juristic political rule.208 Secondly, some have 
                                                          
205. See Section II.B.3, supra. 
206. See generally MUHAMMAD BAQR AL-SADR, AL BANK AL-LA RIBAWI FI’L ISLAM 
(1973). 
207. See id. at 6–7. (“[A]nd this type of limited incremental implementation will not permit 
the idea behind the prohibition of riba to bear its full fruit, or to serve the same objectives that 
could be achieved if placed within the comprehensive implementation of the entire Islamic re-
gime.”). 
208. Iran’s numerous failures on so many fronts are beyond the scope of this Article but some 
bear mentioning given my endorsement of a Shi’i jurist who played some role in its current legal 
system. While advocating functionality in jurisprudence and social justice in economic affairs, 
Sadr barely seems cognizant, given his lack of writings on the subject, of the possibility that his 
beloved marja’iyya might be corrupted by political rule or otherwise compromised by political 
realities, which would thereby thwart any economic or social agenda. This is precisely what oc-
curred in Iran, both in terms of economic and financial planning as well as in the elimination of 
political opponents, even when they might be jurists. See, e.g., NIKKI R. KEDDIE, MODERN IRAN: 
ROOTS AND RESULTS OF REVOLUTION 256, 262–84 (2003) (economic failures); MALLAT, supra 
note 5, at 152–57 (land reform failures); ROY, supra note 32, at 138–40 (economic failures); R. 
James Woolsey, WWIV: Who We’re Fighting—and Why, 4 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 1, 7 
(2004) (discussing house arrest of former heir apparent to Khomeini, the jurist Ayatollah Mon-
tazeri). In addition, the consequences in Iran of juristic rule were particularly appalling from a 
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argued that juristic rule and the imposition of an Islamic legal system is 
entirely discordant with the notion of the shari’a, which is by its con-
ception broadly diverse and in which competing and inconsistent inter-
pretations exist alongside one another.209 Finally, there is the question of 
practicality. There is nothing to suggest revolutionary transformational 
appetite among Islamic nations, which have by and large adopted mod-
ern, secular commercial codes as their developmental models.210 The 
functional revolution and the constitutional moment sought by Sadr thus 
require adjustment in a manner that assumes secular political rule and 
seeks to create, within any particular political entity, voluntary forms of 
commercial activity operating under functionally reformulated Islamic 
rules and principles. 
                                                                                                                                      
human rights perspective given shari’a provisions, unopposed by Sadr, that do not recognize reli-
gious freedom for religions other than Islam and certain “protected” faiths, permit child marriage, 
and render a woman’s testimony half the value as that of a man’s, all of which found their way 
into Iranian law. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 2 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 2005, 
at 1831–32, 1838–39 (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61688.htm. 
Respecting women in particular, Sadr hardly fits the cartoonish cliché of a crazed, turbaned mi-
sogynist who objects to the presence of women anywhere in the public sphere, given the promi-
nent role his sister Bint al-Huda played in Islamic revivalism with his encouragement. See 
MALLAT, supra note 5, at 16 (describing Bint al-Huda as leading the “feminist rubric” of the Is-
lamic revival and as a contributor to a Najaf journal edited by Sadr); Aziz, supra note 31, at 210 
(describing Sadr’s role at the journal); Mottahedeh, Introduction to LESSONS IN ISLAMIC 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 28, 31 (describing the role of Bint al-Huda before and after 
Sadr’s arrest). Nevertheless, there is no indication that he was in the slightest interested in reform-
ing troublesome areas of the shari’a to ensure broader rights for women. My endorsement of Sa-
drism must, therefore, be qualified as I share neither Sadr’s political views, nor his apparent disin-
terest in shari’a reform in multiple areas. Still, Sadr’s deep and abiding concern with social 
justice in Islamic economic and financial affairs as well as the functional jurisprudence he em-
ploys to achieve this worthy objective are noteworthy and deserving of greater consideration and 
respect, whatever his other faults may be. 
209. Professor An-Na’im discusses this primarily in the context of Sunni jurisprudence, indi-
cating that a State could not, in the exercise of its ordinary political functions, simply enact one of 
the many available interpretations of shari’a and plausibly declare that one version to be the true 
Islamic version above all others. See Abdullahi An-Na’im, Shari’a and Positive Legislation: Is an 
Islamic State Possible or Viable?, in 5 YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 29 
(Eugene Cotran & Chibli Mallat eds., 2000). If this is true with respect to Sunni jurisprudence, it 
is emphatically more the case with respect to Shi’ism and its plethora of mujtahids with compet-
ing interpretations, whose disagreements are the very basis for the informal hierarchy of Usuli 
Shi’ism. See SADR, supra note 84, at 21 (“If the mujtahids…agree in their opinions and fatwas, 
then a follower may follow any as he wishes, but this is purely a theoretical assumption which 
would not happen in actual life normally because ijtihad is most often the occasion for disagree-
ments.”). The breakdown of the historic Shi’i system once political authority is involved can be 
seen in Iran’s implementation of juristic rule, where, rather than compete with others for follow-
ers and their financial contributions, reformist jurists have little opportunity to express alternative 
views and are silenced by the force of the State. See Woolsey, supra note 208, at 7 (providing an 
example of dissenting views being silenced by Iran). 
210. See BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 188 (1998). 
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A number of Muslim nations, most notably Malaysia, permit the op-
eration of Islamic financial institutions alongside their more conven-
tional counterparts,211 and it is here where functional approaches can 
most sensibly be tested. These institutions will need to operate within 
boundaries set by established political authorities. This will prevent the 
institutions from engaging in entirely transformed types of social and 
economic interaction. However, this necessary conservatism, whether 
viewed as the initial step towards broader social transformation, or al-
ternative limited means of living within the substantial ideological and 
political constraints and assumptions imposed by the type of free market 
economy whose institutions dominate the earth, should not derogate 
from the socially desired outcome—an alternative means of voluntary 
social and economic association developed under Islamic doctrine 
where notions of mutuality and social justice play as important an insti-
tutional role as profit and economic gain. 
The second transformation necessary to reform, or rather expand, 
Sadr’s revolutionary functional notions relates to the specific interpre-
tive community charged with the task. Specifically, the applicability of 
Sadrist functionalism might be somewhat limited if the relevant inter-
pretive community were defined exclusively as the Najaf marja’iyya. 
Most importantly, Sunni Muslims, who comprise 85% of the world’s 
Muslims,212 recognize no institutional role for the marja’iyya, and their 
ability to participate in such a revolutionary functional exercise would 
be limited if predicated on marja’iyya endorsement. Secondly, despite 
their supposed respect for Sadr,213 their fellow mujtahid, it is not clear 
that the marja’iyya in Najaf are interested in functionalism. My own 
discussions with clerics in Najaf leave me optimistic about their will-
ingness to permit doctrine to evolve to meet the needs and demands of 
Muslim society in areas such as commerce and finance. Nevertheless, it 
is also true that the most prominent member of the Shi’a marja’iyya is 
currently Ayatollah Ali Sistani, whose works betray a deep and abiding 
attachment to formalism.214 
                                                          
211. WARDE, supra note 195, at 123. This does require some level of cooperation and coor-
dination between religious and political authorities, a matter to which I intend to devote consid-
erably more attention in the future. For purposes of this Article, it is only important to note as an 
aside that in order for Muslim societies to realize the goals to which their populations aspire re-
specting such contemporary Islamic ideals as social justice and mutuality in matters of commerce, 
both political and religious reform will be vitally necessary. 
212. Freamon, supra note 90, at 303 n.14. 
213. See id. at 347 (noting how the death of Sadr “galvanized the Shi’a ulama in Iraq and 
Iran”). 
214. Sistani is frequently lauded in the United States press for his relatively “quietist” role in 
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To the extent that the marja’iyya was less receptive to Sadrist func-
tionalism, Shi’a could instead seek to work through “deviationist” mu-
jtahids who could arise.  Whether former students within the Najaf 
marja’iyya or not, it is possible to imagine a body of Shi’i scholars 
separating themselves from the Najaf marja’iyya and developing alter-
native approaches to finance and other areas of the shari’a within a 
separate institution. The revised revolution could thus begin with some-
thing akin to an uprising within Usuli Shi’ism itself by those promulgat-
ing this deviationist Islamic doctrine, and the relevant interpretive 
community could then bind the enterprise with whatever objective limi-
tations it saw fit. The extent to which it took hold within Shi’ism gener-
ally would depend entirely on its popularity among the lay Shi’a who 
supported the deviationist jurists.215 
For Sunnis, the view is slightly more nuanced and potentially more 
democratic. There is no notion within Sunni jurisprudence of mujtahids 
deriving authority as the Hidden Imam’s deputies. However, because 
Sunnism accepts juristic consensus, or ijma, as a source of the shari’a, 
Sunni jurisprudence has some room to develop functional deviationism 
on the basis of communal understandings, though it requires a trans-
formed understanding of what ijma might mean. That is, ijma cannot 
mean, as it currently does in the context of Islamic finance, the fixing of 
particular applications of qiyas for all times and places by reason of a 
                                                                                                                                      
political affairs. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, A Nobel for Sistani, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, § 
4, at 13. Too much can be made of this. While it is true that Sistani does not believe in a role for 
jurists in political affairs in the way that Sadr and Khomeini did, this “quietism” harks back to 
Usuli Shi’ism’s most formalist stages, prior to the appearance of Sadr, when increasingly ignored 
and irrelevant jurists continued to write tiresome, lengthy risalas about arcane points of Shi’i law, 
while other secular ideologies such as Marxism took hold over the lay Shi’a imagination. A brief 
look at Sistani’s website will demonstrate the extent to which Sistani is himself captivated by 
such ruminations. See Sayyid Ali Husaini Sistani, Islamic Laws: Najis Things—Sweat of an 
Animal Who Persistently Eats Najasat, ¶ 119,  
http://www.sistani.org/local.php?modules=nav&nid=2&bid=59&pid=2866 (last visited Oct. 10, 
2007) (regarding whether the perspiration of a man who engages in sexual intercourse when he 
should be fasting is ritually impure). This is not to suggest that Sistani’s reluctant forays into poli-
tics have been less than salutary; commentators are right to credit him as a generally positive 
force within Iraq. However, to expect from Sistani anything by way of alternative approaches to 
the shari’a, whether they are functionalism in economics or finance or other reformist ideas in the 
context of women’s rights or criminal law, is unrealistic given Sistani’s unabashed orthodoxy, of 
which “quietism” is but one of its many manifestations. 
215. Of course, given the nature of Usuli Shi’ism, the development of a deviationist school 
would be radical and not a step to be taken lightly, as the implication of the move would be that 
the marja’iyya had strayed to the point that it no longer spoke for the Mahdi, and an alternative 
institution of authority was needed. 
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consensus reached at a particular time.216 Instead, the ijma would be 
fluid, permitting the community to retell its narrative history during 
seminal moments, emphasizing some values over others and recasting 
Islamic doctrine to achieve openly ideological and ethical objectives, 
but doing so in a manner that also binds those charged with interpreting 
within the newly energized jurisprudence with objective limitations on 
the interpretive effort. My colleague Professor Freamon introduces 
something akin to this in his call on largely Sunni jurisprudential 
grounds for an Islamic ban on slavery based upon Muslim consensus 
against the practice, notwithstanding the fact that the Qur’an and the 
hadith, at the very least, presuppose slavery’s existence.217 
Professor Freamon contends something akin to Sadr’s deviationism. 
Freamon emphasizes values of equality that may have lain dormant for 
centuries in the context of slavery, pointing to a growing and now virtu-
ally complete ideological and ethical conviction within Islam against the 
practice. He seeks a prohibition through a new understanding of Islamic 
doctrine that tells a compelling historical narrative and is objectively 
bounded, but is nonetheless, by his admission, changing centuries of 
understanding concerning the Islamic rules on the practice of slavery.218 
Largely on the basis of ijma, he ultimately uses Islamic doctrine to 
achieve a deviationist ideological objective that proscribes, on Islamic 
grounds, a practice in which some of Muhammad’s closest Companions 
engaged. 
A liberalized form of ijma along these lines could be extended to the 
question of Islamic finance, given the desire of the community to articu-
late jurisprudence in a manner that would render commerce and finan-
cial association as much about fair dealing and social justice as earning 
money. A community of Sunni Muslims, presumably schooled in Is-
lamic thought, could develop their own deviationist and functional no-
tions of Islamic finance and seek to apply them. They may, indeed they 
would, need to redevelop Langdellian notions of jurisprudence to 
achieve this, but there is no reason that they could not seek to do so. 
This self-designated “deviationist” community could then reorganize 
financial institutions along functional and self-acknowledged ideologi-
cal lines by telling its own compelling Sadrist tale of Islamic mutuality 
and economic justice throughout the ages. Whether this movement 
                                                          
216. See note 60 and accompanying text, supra. 
217. See Bernard K. Freamon, Slavery, Freedom and the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic 
Jurisprudence, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1998). 
218. See id. at 28–29. 
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would remain an isolated, deviationist tribe or result in a new under-
standing of Sunni jurisprudence would depend entirely on the popularity 
of the idea within the Sunni community. If functional financial institu-
tions were to take hold and dominate the community, I could then argue, 
using Professor Freamon’s ideas, that the understanding of what riba 
and gharar were intended to encompass had shifted, and a different un-
derstanding was required, sanctified through ijma. In the absence of 
such unanimity of Sunni belief, the deviationist movement could con-
tinue as long as it had sufficient support to sustain it. 
Thus, the absence of a defined community like the marja’iyya would 
make the determination of an ijma more problematic in the Sunni con-
text, but, as Professor Freamon’s example shows in the context of slav-
ery, hardly impossible. Sadr’s ideological and functional deviationism 
could thus survive the failures of the political revolution within the 
Sunni and Shi’i communities alike. 
VI. REFORMED SADRISM IN APPLICATION 
I have elsewhere provided primitive examples of doctrinal mechanics 
using ideas promulgated by Sanhuri, Sadr, and others that would allow 
for functionalism in reformulating the doctrines of riba and gharar to 
achieve the communal expectations of mutuality and social justice in a 
more practicable manner than Sadr may have envisioned.219 It is not my 
purpose to repeat those here, primarily because the focus of this Article 
is less on the economic principles underlying the communal expecta-
tions and more on the jurisprudential ideas necessary to sustain them. 
Suffice it to say that it is not difficult to develop doctrine that is consis-
tent with foundational text, meets communal expectations by emphasiz-
ing or favoring mutuality in most economic transactions, prohibit highly 
exploitative and lucrative gain, and ban excessive speculation. The 
greater challenge will be in ensuring commercial practicability, a matter 
that can only be tested experientially. 
Therefore, rather than repeat the mechanical exercise, I demonstrate 
the potential relevance of functionalism in Islamic finance to the 
broader financial world by indicating the extent to which it could en-
gage the global financial community on topics of contemporary impor-
tance. I have selected as an example one such topic that has been dis-
cussed with varying degrees of interest over the past two decades; 
namely, the extent to which a commercial bank should engage in activi-
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ties commonly attributed to other financial services institutions such as 
investment banks.220 These activities would include the underwriting of 
securities, the purchase and sale of securities, the ownership of equity 
interests in non-financial firms, and the offering of money market mu-
tual funds wherein customers open accounts that are invested in highly 
liquid, low risk and low return securities from which they can withdraw 
relatively freely. I summarize the issue first and follow with a discus-
sion of the manner in which issues like this are entirely divorced from 
the realities of the formalist practice of Islamic finance, whereas an al-
ternative, deviationist Islamic model based on functional notions could 
potentially contribute ideas and practices to the global discussion that 
may prove helpful. 
A. Debate over Universal Banking 
Much of the discourse in the United States concerning the wisdom of 
permitting a single financial institution to engage in both traditional 
banking activities and investment banking activities has dissipated with 
the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, which permits in-
vestment banking firms and commercial banks to be affiliates of one 
another under an umbrella holding company.221 This repealed the De-
pression Era Glass-Steagall Act, which had forbidden such associa-
tions,222 and with it, the United States joined most other developed na-
tions in either permitting affiliations between commercial and 
investment banks or, in the case of some nations such as Germany, al-
lowing a single unified financial institution to engage in both activi-
ties.223 Nevertheless, the issue retains some importance because not all 
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nations have followed the recent trend; China, for example, continues to 
forbid its banks from operating in the stock market.224 
The reasons for and against such mergers have been extensively dis-
cussed in the academic literature. The most prominent reasons against 
permitting financial institutions to engage both in commercial and in-
vestment banking inevitably relate to bank instability and potential con-
flicts of interest. The argument is that the banks might take risks that 
would lead to losses, and consequently, a bank run.225 For example, two 
scholars have maintained that banks in Germany often lend to busi-
nesses that they expect will be able to repay such loans through issu-
ances in the stock market, making them particularly vulnerable to mar-
ket fluctuations.226 Risks could also be amplified if the bank were to 
make loans to firms in which the bank had a significant investment that 
were not performing well even if this was against the interests of de-
positors.227 Moreover, the larger the bank, the more likely that it would 
operate under the belief that it was simply “too big to fail,” which would 
by itself encourage excessive risk taking.228 
Critics also contend that banks’ perverse incentives will hamper the 
efficient operation of a proper stock market and stock market prices will 
be distorted by bank interference.229 China banned commercial banks 
from investing in the securities markets in order to prevent incidences of 
overspeculation that occurred prior to the ban.230 Others have concerns 
that relate to the potential for monopolistic behavior, whether it be the 
reduction of consumer choice, the crowding out of smaller financial in-
stitutions, or an unhealthy concentration of power.231 
In the context of banks seeking to offer clients money market mutual 
funds, other issues could arise. For example, as investments in these 
funds surely would not be considered equivalent to a bank deposit for 
regulatory purposes, they probably would not be counted toward any 
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premium against which banks were required to insure their investments, 
nor would they count toward any reserve requirements a bank was re-
quired to maintain.232 Given these factors and the superficial similarity 
of such money market funds to bank deposits, banks might prefer to en-
courage purchases of the former as against the latter. This does raise 
concerns, however, given that the money market accounts have more 
risk associated with them and because banks might not be the most ap-
propriate vehicles to offer them, due to their strong association with a 
similar but safer form of deposit.233 
There are several arguments in favor of the universal banking model 
as well. Supporters of the merging of investment banks with universal 
banks argue that the new institutions are more broadly diversified and 
therefore more stable.234 In addition, there are potential synergies to be 
gained from a combination of the two practices into one firm due to the 
similar lines of business and overlapping client bases.235 This could also 
permit universal banks to be more effective at restructuring troubled 
firms because they could hold both the firm’s outstanding loans and a 
significant portion of its outstanding securities.236 More broadly, if 
banks held equity interests in the companies to which they loaned 
money, they would be better and more efficiently able to monitor and 
control the loans they had offered.237 Finally, there is an argument that 
the development of fewer and more concentrated institutions in the fi-
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nancial services sector would reduce regulatory costs, though, at least in 
jurisdictions such as the United States, such a benefit is not clear. The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act did not seem to reduce the level of oversight 
or the number of governmental bodies responsible for banking regula-
tion; several regulatory bodies continue to exercise oversight over any 
given financial holding company.238 
B. Islamic Reverberations 
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from even a cursory 
evaluation of the above concerns is their considerable distance from 
anything within the frame of reference of contemporary Islamic finance. 
As developed under the Langdellian hermeneutic, Islamic finance could 
add nothing to the debate simply because it claims not to be engaged in 
the practice of offering debt in the way that a conventional bank does; it 
claims instead to be operating already as a mutual fund, with the funds 
of its “investors” taking part in the purchase and sale of “assets” through 
the murabaha and “profits” being shared between the institution and the 
“investors” as they would be in a mutual fund.239 Islamic banks could 
not continue to indulge this fantasy and seriously enter the debate over 
universal banking. Therefore, any developing Muslim nation attempting 
to decide whether it is better in its particular context to separate com-
mercial banking activities from investment banking activities, permit 
affiliations as in the United States or even promote the existence of sin-
gle unified entities as in Germany would not look to Islam in its formal-
ist manifestation to answer this question. 
By contrast, it is striking to note how relevant functional Islamic doc-
trine potentially could be in contributing to a debate on this issue. So 
many of the areas of debate, whether they relate to the risk of bank fail-
ures, the concerns of excessive speculation on the part of banks, the po-
tential for limitations on consumer choice or the possibility of a conflict 
that works to a client’s detriment and the bank’s gain, directly implicate 
notions of mutuality of interest, exploitation, unfairness, social justice, 
speculation, and excessive uncertainty that could form the backbone of 
a functionally reformulated doctrine of riba and gharar.240 Islamic 
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banks could influence the decisions of Muslim societies with respect to 
the question of universal banks and, in any event, the banks could make 
their own independent decisions concerning their entry into securities 
markets to the extent that these decisions do not conflict with national 
law. 
Regardless of the decision a bank makes respecting universalization, 
it would be part of the evolution of the financial system. If Islamic 
banks were to deem universal banking to be permissible, they could act 
as experimental models for nations that were interested in determining 
the suitability of universal banks more broadly. By contrast, if Islamic 
banks felt that the universal banks contravened functionally derived Is-
lamic prohibitions, a Muslim nation could permit general entry of banks 
into securities markets and compare the performance of those banks that 
did enter with the performance of similarly situated Islamic banks that 
did not. In either of these cases, Islamic financial institutions would be 
contributing to a healthier economic polity, deeply relevant to funda-
mental questions concerning commerce and finance, and more effec-
tively serving the goals that the original creators of Islamic finance ar-
ticulated: fairness and social justice in a unique Islamic context. 
CONCLUSION 
The existential problem facing Islamic finance seems clear. From the 
standpoint of determining the ideal means of organizing society, the 
practice is entirely irrelevant given its deep and abiding attachment to 
an interpretive hermeneutic akin to Langdellianism. This is entirely in-
consistent with the notions of its founders and many of its current ad-
herents who expect it to offer to Muslims an alternative, fairer, more 
mutual and more humane system of economic order. 
The ideas of economic revolution developed by one of Islam’s most 
influential modern jurists, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, betray an aston-
ishing level of functionalism in which Islamic doctrine is explicitly de-
veloped on the basis of subjective political, ideological, and ethical pre-
suppositions and is designed precisely to achieve these mutuality and 
social justice objectives. Unlike the critical legal theorist, however, Sadr 
does not argue that all doctrine is subjective, but that subjectivity is in-
evitably part of the interpretive process. Sadr’s notions presuppose the 
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existence of an institution, the marja’iyya, which is entrusted with the 
theological authority to redefine the shari’a on ideological and ethical 
bases, and then subsequently to constrain individual jurists as well as 
the ordinary lawmaking process with external and objective disciplining 
rules so as to ensure an objective and neutral role for the shari’a in 
rulemaking. Despite certain flaws in his ideas, and, in particular, Sadr’s 
association of the political with the economic under a single revolution-
ary Islamic rubric, Sadr’s radical blend of objectivist and subjectivist 
jurisprudence can play an important role today in rescuing Islamic fi-
nance from increasingly silly Langdellianism in order to permit Islamic 
finance to contribute to developments in global banking in a manner 
that retains its faithfulness to its populist, mutualist, and deeply Islamic 
roots. 
